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We use several data sets to consider the effect of teaching practices on student beliefs, as well as on
organization of firms and institutions. In cross-country data, we show that teaching practices (such
as copying from the board versus working on projects together) are strongly related to various dimensions
of social capital, from beliefs in cooperation to institutional outcomes. We then use micro-data to investigate
the influence of teaching practices on student beliefs about cooperation both with each other and with
teachers, and students’ involvement in civic life. A two-stage least square strategy provides evidence
that teaching practices have an independent sizeable effect on student social capital. The relationship
between teaching practices and student test performance is nonlinear.  The evidence supports the idea
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1. Introduction 
Since the path-breaking work of Banfield (1958), Coleman (1990), and Putnam (1993, 2000), 
social  scientists  have  argued  that  social  capital,  defined  broadly  as  the  capacity  of  people  in  a 
community to cooperate with others outside their family, is an important determinant of various 
social outcomes.   The list of such outcomes includes the provision of public goods (Putman 1993), 
economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997, Algan and Cahuc 2010), formation of large firms and 
organizations (La Porta et al. 1997), financial development (Guiso et al. 2004), trade (Guiso et al. 
2009), as well as methods of state intervention (Djankov et al. 2003, Aghion et al. 2010).  Many social 
scientists have also argued that social capital is highly persistent over time (Putnam 1993, Guiso et al. 
2007), largely because the underlying beliefs regarding the benefits of trust and cooperation are 
transmitted in communities through families (e.g., Bisin and Verdier 2001, Tabellini 2008, Guiso et al. 
2008) or social interactions (Benabou and Tirole 2010).  
The emphasis on family transmission leads to a sanguine assessment of the possibility of 
raising the levels of social capital in a community, since not much scope for action is left for the 
community itself.  But is it really the case that only families play a role?  Is there a possibility that a 
community can raise its own levels of social capital collectively?   
In  this  paper,  we  explore  an  alternative,  and  complementary,  mechanism  of  how  social 
capital is transmitted in a community, namely schooling.  Aghion et al. (2010) and Guiso et al. (2010) 
note that schools rather than families might contribute to such transmission.  There is some evidence 
that a greater quantity of schooling leads to higher social capital (Milligan et al. 2004, Helliwell and 
Putnam 2007, Glaeser et al. 2007) and has other desirable non-pecuniary benefits (Oreopoulos and 
Salvanes 2011).   Our emphasis will be not on the quantity of schooling, but on how students are 
taught.   
The idea that how students are taught shapes their beliefs is of course not new.  Teaching 
students ethics and civicness are established goals of school systems in many countries, which also 
animate the progressive education movement (Dewey 1944).  More recently, the Marxist critique of 
capitalist education (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970, Bowles and Gintis 1976) sees these objectives as 
mechanisms of perpetuating the social order.   Our paper is an empirical exploration into the effects 
of progressive education.  
Our  starting  observation  is  that  the  methods  of  teaching  differ  tremendously  across 
countries, and between schools within a country.  Some schools emphasize what we call vertical 
teaching methods, whereby teachers primarily lecture, students take notes or read textbooks, and   3 
teachers ask students questions.   The central relationship in the classroom is between the teacher 
and the student.  Other schools emphasize what  we call  horizontal teaching methods, whereby 
students work in groups, do projects together, and ask teachers questions.  The central relationship 
in the classroom is among students.  Consistent with the idea that beliefs underlying social capital 
are acquired through the practice of cooperation, we hypothesize that horizontal teaching methods 
are conducive to the formation of social capital, whereas vertical teaching methods are not.    
To pursue our study, we assemble data on teaching methods across schools from several 
multi-country data sources.   The three data bases we examine are 1) the Civic Education Study (CES), 
run in 1999 in 25 countries to assess the level of civic knowledge of mostly 14 year olds in the 8
th and 
9
th grades, 2) the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), conducted in 1995 
in 33 countries and focused similarly on the 8
th graders, and 3) the Program for International Student 
Assessment (PISA), which we use for 2000 and 2003 waves for 15 year olds in 36 countries.   The CES 
data  in  particular  contains  a  great  deal  of  student-level  information  about  student  beliefs  and 
characteristics,  as  well  as  characteristics  of  their  teachers  and  their  schools,  including  most 
importantly  teaching  methods.    In  our  empirical  work,  we  emphasize  the  distinction  between 
“teachers lectures” and “students work in groups” as measures of vertical and horizontal teaching 
methods.  We can then use the CES at the student and school level to relate teaching methods to 
student beliefs, and use all data sources at the country level to relate teaching methods to a variety 
of measures of both beliefs and social outcomes.  
In  doing  so,  we  seek  to  address  four  questions.    First,  do  teaching  methods  vary 
systematically across countries?  The answer to this question is a clear yes. Students work in groups 
more in Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) and Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, United 
States and to a lesser extent Great Britain).  This teaching practice is less common in East European 
countries and the Mediterranean (Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Italy). In contrast, 
in East European and Mediterranean countries, teachers spend more timing lecturing. 
Second, are teaching practices related to social capital and institutional quality at the country 
level?  We consider several dimensions of social capital, but also several aspects of the quality of 
institutions.  In all cross-country specifications, we control for per capita income and average years of 
education.  We find a variety of interesting correlations.  In terms of beliefs, students in countries 
with vertical teaching methods assess a lower value of cooperation with other students and have a 
lower view of teacher fairness and willingness to listen than do students in countries with horizontal 
teaching methods.  Vertical teaching is also associated with greater belief (from the WVS) that it is 
the duty of children to respect their parents.  Such methods are associated with students feeling “like   4 
an outsider” and “awkward and out of place” in the classroom (from PISA), and are highly negatively 
correlated with trust and association membership, the two standard measures of beliefs underlying 
social capital from the WVS.  Finally, vertical teaching methods are associated with lower trust in civil 
servants and lower level of belief that civil servants treat citizens fairly (both measures from the 
International Social Survey Program).  It appears that subordination to teachers as a student leads to 
a feeling – and perhaps a reality -- of subordination to bureaucrats as an adult. 
With respect to “real outcomes” as opposed to just beliefs, we looked at organization of 
firms, which some studies find to be related to social capital (La Porta et al. 1997, Bloom et al. 2007).   
We find that vertical teaching methods are associated with lower assessed incidence of delegation of 
authority  in  firms  (Global  Competitiveness  Report)  and  lower  perceived  freedom  of  daily  work 
organization  (European  Social  Survey).  Again,  teaching  practices  appear  to  translate  into  work 
practices, suggesting that social skills learned in school are used later. We also find that vertical 
teaching methods are related to a perception of inferior labor relations. Perceived unfairness of 
teachers may lead to that of bosses. We also look at two measures of institutional quality: the 
(subjective) government effectiveness index from Kauffman et al. (2008) and the objective measure 
of entry regulation from Djankov et al. (2002), and find that vertical teaching methods are associated 
with lower government effectiveness and higher entry regulations.  
Suggestive as it is, the macro evidence always suffers from omitted variable problems, as 
well as from reverse causality. Accordingly, in the second part of the paper, we turn to the micro 
data.  The third question we ask is whether differences in teaching practices also influence student 
beliefs across schools within a country, holding country fixed effects constant to control for national 
educational policies and social capital.  We thus exploit the variation in teaching practices between 
schools to identify the effect of teaching practices.  We show that not only countries but also schools 
and teachers differ a lot in their reliance on vertical and horizontal teaching practices.   Indeed, 
teaching practices vary considerably not just across schools but between teachers within schools.  
Because  of  how  our  data  are  constructed,  however,  we  can  only  exploit  the  effect  of  teaching 
practices on student beliefs across but not within schools.  The CES randomly samples students from 
a given classroom, and interviews exactly the same set of teachers for every sampled student.  We 
thus do not have any sources of variation in student beliefs due to different allocation of students to 
teachers within the same classroom.   We examine the determinants of teaching practices both 
within  and  between  schools,  where  the  observation  is  student  teacher  pair.    The  within  school 
evidence, while not usable for understanding the influence of teaching practices on student beliefs, 
will turn out to be helpful in interpreting our instruments.     5 
We first estimate the relationship between teaching practices and student beliefs using OLS 
specification.  We  control  for  an  extensive  list  of  student,  teacher,  and  school  characteristics, 
including the teacher and school level of social capital. This allows us to disentangle the role of 
teaching  practices  from  other  channel  of  transmission  of  social  capital  through  teacher  or  peer 
effects. We find a significant relationship between those practices and various dimensions of student 
social capital, including beliefs in cooperation with other students and with teachers, association 
membership, trust in institutions, and indexes of participation in the civil society. 
Yet the  OLS  results  cannot  completely  answer  our  fourth  question,  namely  whether  the 
relationship between teaching practices and social capital is causal.  The trouble is that differences in 
teaching methods may reflect the differences in the beliefs or preferences of the community rather 
than  exert  an  independent  influence  on  student  beliefs.    For  example,  teachers  specializing  in 
horizontal  teaching  methods  might  be  selected,  or  even  self-select,  into  high  social  capital 
communities.    Alternatively,  teachers  might  adjust  their  practices  to  the  social  capital  of  their 
students.  If teaching methods entirely reflect community preferences, then one might still argue 
that only families shape beliefs, and schools merely reinforce what families teach kids already.   If 
teaching methods have an independent component, there is a possibility that schools can build social 
capital even in communities where parents lack it.    
To  shed  light  on  the  question  of  causality,  we  instrument  teaching  practices  using  two 
distinct instrumental variables.  The first is teacher gender, which in the first stage regression is a 
highly  significant  determinant  of  teaching  practices  even  holding  teacher  social  capital  constant 
(female teachers use horizontal teaching methods more heavily).   Female teachers thus seem to 
prefer  group  projects  to  lecturing.    The  second  instrument  is  teacher  interest  in  additional 
instructional time from teacher surveys, which is also a significant predictor of teaching practices in 
first stage estimates (teachers who want more instructional time use vertical teaching methods more 
heavily).  Teachers seeking more instructional time plausibly are more focused on getting through 
the curriculum, which often requires lecturing.  We find a substantial amount of variation in both 
teacher gender and teacher interest in additional instructional time across but also within schools.  
Moreover, these teacher characteristics predict teacher practices within schools as well.  The within-
school evidence suggests that our instruments reflect teacher characteristics and preferences, and 
not  characteristics  of  students  or  communities,  and  hence  are  uncorrelated  with  the  possibly 
omitted school or community characteristics.  In addition, over-identification tests do not reject their 
exogeneity.  The 2SLS estimates show that teaching practices have a sizeable causal effect on student 
beliefs.   Horizontal teaching practices, on the margin, appear to have an independent impact on 
student social capital, and perhaps through this channel on various social outcomes.      6 
One might worry that horizontal teaching practices raise social capital at the expense of 
academic  achievement.    To  address  this  concern,  we  use  student  level  data  to  ask  whether 
educational quality is compromised by teaching practices favorable to the formation of social capital. 
We find that extreme bias toward some teaching practices is detrimental to test scores, and that a 
mixture of horizontal and vertical teaching practices supports best academic performance.  
Section 2 describes our data sources and measures of teaching methods and looks at the 
cross-country correlations between teaching practices and various outcomes including social capital 
and  institutions.    Section  3  presents  the  micro  evidence  on  the  relationship  between  teaching 
methods and student beliefs using variation between schools by including country fixed effects, and 
using  2SLS  regression  to  identify  the  independent  effect  from  teaching  practices  on  beliefs  in 
cooperation. In Section 4, we consider student test scores.   Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Teaching practices and Aggregate outcomes  
This  section  investigates  the  cross-country  relationships  between  teaching  practices 
measured at the country level and various social outcomes, including trust and civic life, but also the 
organization of firms and public institutions.  Aggregate data allow us to consider both beliefs and 
“real outcomes”, although concerns with omitted variables might be greater than with micro data.  
2.1 Cross-country comparisons on teaching practices 
We start by exploring a first issue: do teaching practices vary across countries? While the 
literature has so far focused on the quantity of schooling, we open the black box of schools by 
looking at how children at taught in the different countries.  
We illustrate teaching practices at the country level by using two main databases: the “Civic 
Education Study” (CES) and the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS).  The 
CES  is  a  survey  run  in  1999  by  the  International  Association  for  the  Evaluation  of  Educational 
Achievement (IEA).  The CES is designed to assess the civic knowledge of students in grade 8 (or 
grade  9  for  certain  countries)  in 25  countries:  Australia,  Bulgaria,  Chile,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic, 
Denmark,  England,  Estonia,  Finland,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Norway, 
Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Russian  Federation,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Sweden,  Switzerland, 
United States. In addition to the individual student survey, the CES includes school-principal and 
teacher  background  questionnaires.  Critically,  the  teacher  questionnaire  requests  detailed 
information on teaching practices of the teachers.  Each of the participating countries randomly   7 
samples the students to be surveyed using a two-stage stratified sampling design.  The primary 
sampling unit (PSU) is the schools randomly selected in each country.  The students from grade 8 are 
then randomly picked from the assigned class in the selected school.  The teachers of those selected 
students complete individual surveys (as did school principals).  For students with multiple teachers 
(up to a maximum of five in the database), all the teachers complete the questionnaire.  
The individual teacher surveys ask the following questions about teaching practices: « In your 
class, a) How often do students work in groups? b) How often do students work on projects ? c) How 
often do  students  study  textbooks?  ,  d)  How  often do  students  participate  in  role  play,  e)  How 
often does the teacher lecture? , f) How often does the teacher include discussions, g) How often 
does the teacher asks questions?  ».  The answers take on values 1 for Never, 2 for Sometimes, 3 for 
Often  and  4  for  Very  Often.  To  capture  the  contrast  between  vertical  and  horizontal  teaching 
practices, we focus on the two main oppositional teaching practices from the CES, “Teacher lectures” 
and “Students work in groups.” 
The  second  database  is  TIMSS,  a  multi-country  comparative  test  of  student  cognitive 
achievement in math and science, conducted in 1995 by the IEA, the same international consortium 
that constructed the CES database.  TIMSS is also targeted to students belonging to grade 8
 and cover 
up to 36 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Romania,  Russia,  Singapore,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Spain, 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  Turkey,  United  Kingdom  and  United  States.  The  database  combines 
information from student, school principal, and teacher questionnaires for a representative sample 
of students.   
The TIMSS database covers more and more diverse countries than the CES (the CES is mainly 
centered on European countries), and also asks questions about teaching practices.  Unlike the CES, 
however, TIMSS does not ask specific questions on student beliefs, since the primary focus of this 
study  is  the  assessment  of  cognitive  performance.    Teaching  practices  are  measured  from  the 
individual student surveys conducted in all classrooms in each selected school.  The survey covers the 
classes  in  mathematics,  science,  biology,  chemistry,  and  earth  science.    We  focus  on  teaching 
practices in mathematics, which allows observations for the maximum number of countries.  
The questions on teaching practices most related to our analysis are: “In schools, how often 
do you do these things? Copy notes from the board during the lessons? , Work together in pairs and 
small groups in class?”  The answers range from 1 for All the time, 2 for Often, 3 for Sometimes, to 4   8 
for Never.  We reverse the order of the answers to get a scale comparable to that of the CES.  The 
higher is the value of the TIMSS indicator, the more frequent is the teaching practice.   
Figure  1  presents  the  correlation  between  country  average  scores  of  “Students  work  in 
group” and “Teacher lectures” taken from the CES.  The higher is the value of these indicators, the 
more frequent are these teaching practices based on teacher surveys.  Figure 1 shows a negative 
cross-country correlation between these two practices, with the coefficient of correlation equal to -
0.418.  Students work in groups more in Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) and Anglo-
Saxon countries (Australia, United States and to a lesser extent Great Britain).  This teaching practice 
is less common in East European countries and the Mediterranean (Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and, to 
a lesser extent, Italy). In contrast, in East European and Mediterranean countries, teachers spend 
more timing lecturing.  Figure 1 also suggests that in countries such as Germany and Switzerland 
teachers combine the two practices, or do something else with their class time. 
 
   
Figure 1 – Cross-country correlation in teaching practices: Teacher Lectures versus Students Work in 
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Figure 2 – Cross-country correlation in teaching practices from TIMSS:  country-level score for the 
questions  “Student  take  notes  from  the  board”  and  “Students  work  in  groups”  (1=Never, 
2=Sometime, 3=Often, 4=Always)  
 
Figure 2 shows the country average scores from TIMSS for “Students copy notes from the 
board during the lessons” and “Students work together in pairs and in small groups in class”.  The 
variables  range  from  1  to  4,  a  higher  score  indicating  a  higher  frequency.  The  cross-country 
correlation is -0.137.  In all countries, students take notes from the board more frequently than they 
work in groups.  But they do much more so in France, Japan, Turkey or more generally in most 
Continental and Mediterranean European countries. In contrast, the gap in the country average 
scores for “Students take notes from the board” and “Students work in groups” is the lowest in 
Scandinavian countries and Anglo Saxon countries.   
For countries present in both CES and TIMSS survey, the indicators of teaching practices are 
significantly correlated with each other.  The cross-country correlation between averages of “Teacher 
lectures”  from  CES  and  “Students  take  notes  from  the  board”  from  TIMSS  is  0.328.    The 
corresponding correlation between “Students work in groups” from CES and TIMSS, respectively, is 
0.598.  This correlation pattern shows the consistency of the practices across surveys.  The phrasing 
of the questions differs between CES and TIMSS, but they capture the same broad contrast between 
vertical and horizontal teaching.  This comparison also suggests, importantly, that the students and 
the teachers share the same perceptions of teaching practices, since the questions are administrated 
at the teacher level in CES and at the student level in TIMSS.  Since TIMSS cover a wider spectrum of 
countries, we will base our macro analysis on this database henceforth.  
   10 
2.2 Teaching practices and students beliefs in cooperation  
Having established the large cross-country variation in teaching practices, we now explore 
the relationship between those teaching practices and various dimensions of social capital. We first 
investigate  the  cross-country  relationships  between  teaching  practices  and  student  beliefs  in 
cooperation.  To  measure  beliefs  in  the  aggregate  data,  we  begin  with  a  comprehensive  set  of 
student  attitudes  toward  cooperation  at  school  from  the  Program  for  International  Student 
Assessment (PISA).  This survey was run in 2000, 2003 and 2006 by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD).    The  PISA  survey  is  meant  to  provide  international 
comparison  of  cognitive  skills  of  15  year-old  students,  by  asking  standardized  questions  in 
mathematics, science, reading, and problem-solving.  Information on the way schools are run is 
collected through a school principal questionnaire.  PISA does not include a teacher survey and, 
unlike the CES and the TIMSS, does not report teaching practices in detail.  But the background 
student questionnaire provides an indication of student perception of cooperation among students, 
as well as between students and teachers.  These questions are available in the surveys 2000 and 
2003  for  30  countries  for  which  we  also  have  observations  for  our  control  variables:  Australia, 
Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Chile,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece, 
Hungary,  Iceland,  Indonesia,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Korea,  Latvia,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States.  
The regressions include several controls.  The first is the level of education from the Barro 
and  Lee  database  for  2000.    Education  has  been  found  to  be  crucial  in  explaining  various  civic 
outcomes as well as the development of democracy (Lipset 1959, Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos 
2006, Helliwell and Putnam 2007, Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007).  Another concern is that 
teaching practices proxy for per capita income.  In poor countries, it might be less costly for teachers 
to lecture than to ask students to work in groups.  We control for total annual expenditure per 
student  in  public  institutions  for  secondary  education,  which  corresponds  to  the  grades  where 
teaching  practices  are  measured  in  TIMSS.    Total  expenditure  per  student  is  calculated  as  a 
percentage of GDP in US 2002 dollars adjusted for PPP.  The data come from UNESCO.  An additional 
control is GDP per capita, expressed in US 2000 dollars.  These last two controls are highly correlated. 
From PISA 2000 and 2003, we use the following statements concerning cooperation between 
students:  “I enjoy working with other students in group”, “When we work on a project, I think that it 
is a good idea to combine the ideas of all the students in a group”, “I do my best work when I work 
with other students” and “I learn most when I work with other students in my class”.  The replies to 
each statement range from 1 for Strongly disagree, 2 for disagree, 3 for Agree, and 4 for Strongly   11 
agree.  To ease the interpretation of the results, we create a dummy for each question which equals 
0 if the response is “strongly disagree” or “disagree”, and 1 if the response is “agree” and “strongly 
agree”.  The country level of the variable thus measures the share of students who agree or strongly 
agree with the statement.  We also create a synthetic indicator of “student cooperation” at the 
country level by taking the average over the four questions of the share of students who agree or 
strongly agree with the statement.  The index varies between 0 and 1. 
 Table  1,  Columns  1-3  report  the  OLS  cross-country  estimates  controlling  for  (ln)-school 
expenditure per student, the (ln) income per capita, and average years of education.  Column 1 
shows  a  strong  negative  relationship  between  “student  cooperation”  and  the  country  share  of 
students who never work in groups.  The coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Column 2 shows a negative association between “student cooperation” and the country share of 
students who always take notes from the board; the relationship is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level.  Column 3 reports that the relationship is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
for the Gap between Vertical Teaching and Horizontal Teaching.  Twenty-one percent of the cross-
country variation in beliefs about student cooperation is explained by this gap.  
The  size  of  the  coefficients  is  substantial.  Teaching  practices  are  the  only  variables 
statistically significantly related to “student cooperation”.  None of school expenditure per student, 
income per capita, or average years of education is related to student attitudes toward cooperation.  
To ease the interpretation, we look at the estimates using each question separately rather than at 
their average.  An increase by one-standard deviation (across countries) in the share of students who 
always take notes from the board is associated with a decrease of 8 percentage points in the share of 
students who agree or strongly agree with the statement “I enjoy working with other students in 
group”.  An increase by one standard deviation in the share of students who never work in groups is 
associated with a decrease by 7 percentage points in the share of students who agree or strongly 
agree with the statement: “I learn most when I work with other students in my class”. 
  We  next  turn  to  the  relationship  between  teaching  practices  and  cooperation  between 
teachers and students.  We measure this relationship using student beliefs from PISA.  Students are 
asked  to  consider  the  following  statements:  “In  general  teachers  treat  me  fairly”,  “In  general 
students and teachers get along”, “In general the teacher listens to me”.  The responses range from 1 
for Strongly disagree, 2 for Disagree, 3 for Agree and 4 for Strongly agree.  To measure the country 
level of cooperation with teachers, we create for each statement a dummy equal to 1 if the answer is 
agree or strongly agree, and 0 if the answer is disagree or strongly disagree.  We also look at an 
indicator of “cooperation with teachers” by taking the average of these dummies over the three   12 
statements.  Table 1 shows a strong negative relationship between “cooperation with teachers” and 
the share of students who never work in groups (Col. 4), who always take notes from the board (Col. 
5), or who see a larger Gap between Notes and Groups.  The correlations are statistically significant 
at the 5 or 1 percent level.  Twenty-three percent of the cross-country variation in “cooperation with 
teachers” is explained by the country share of students who never work in groups. 
  We complement this analysis by looking at the relationships between teaching practices and 
beliefs about family life.  From the World Values Survey 2000, we use the question: “Children should 
respect their parents regardless of their merits and their faults”.  The variable equals 1 if the answer 
is yes, and 0 otherwise.  We calculate the country share of positive answers to this question for the 
countries that are also included in TIMSS and for which we have observations on teaching practices. 
Table  2  –  Col.  1-3  show  that  teaching  practices  are  related  to  attitudes  toward  hierarchical 
relationships between children and parents.  The country share of students who always take notes 
from the board is positively related to share of individuals agreeing with the statement that children 
must always respect their parents.  The relationship is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 
and 45 percent of the cross-country variation in family values is explained  by the cross-country 
variation in this teaching practice.   
  Table 2 – Col. 4-6 explore the relationship between students’ feeling of alienation and the 
teaching  practices.  From  PISA,  we  take  two  related  questions:  “In  general,  do  you  feel  like  an 
outsider in your class?”, “In general, do you feel awkward in your class?”.  The answers range from 1 
for Strongly disagree, 2 for Disagree, 3 for Agree to 4 for Strongly agree.  We create a dummy for 
each question equal to 1 if the answer is agree or strongly agree, and 0 if the answer is disagree or 
strongly disagree.  We then create a measure of student alienation by taking the average of these 
dummies.  Table 2 shows that feelings of alienation are positively related to “Always take notes from 
the board”; the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  Forty five percent of the 
cross-country variation in student alienation is explained by the share of students who always take 
notes from the board.  Working in groups is not associated with alienation.  
 
2.3 Teaching practices and Aggregate Social capital  
2.3.1 Teaching practices, Trust and Civic life 
This section looks at the broader implications of teaching practices for trust and civic life at 
the country level.  Figure 3 shows the relationship between the country level of trust and the Gap 
between “Vertical Teaching” and “Horizontal Teaching.”  Trust is measured by the standard question 
from the World Values Survey 2000: “In general do you think you can trust others or one cannot be   13 
too careful?”  The answer is 1 if the respondent trusts others, and zero otherwise.  We calculate the 
country average level of trust. Vertical and Horizontal teaching measures are taken from TIMSS, as 
described before, and Gap is the country level difference between the two.  The correlation between 
Gap  and  trust  is  strongly  negative;  almost  one  third  of  the  cross-country  variation  in  trust  is 
explained  by  the  variation  in  teaching  practices.    Scandinavian  countries  (with  the  exception  of 
Finland), and to a lesser extent Anglo-Saxon countries, combine both a fairly high level of trust and 
teaching practices tilted toward horizontal rather than vertical.  In contrast, most Mediterranean 
(Turkey, France and Greece in the first place) and East European countries are characterized by 
teaching practices biased toward the vertical and low levels of trust.  The big outliers are Japan and 
Ireland, which tilt toward vertical teaching practices but have high trust.  
Table  3  documents  the  robustness  of  the  relationships  between  generalized  trust  and 
teaching practices by including income per capita, school expenditure per student, and average years 
of education at the country level.  Columns 1-2 show a negative correlation between generalized 
trust and the shares of students who “always take notes from the board”, “never work in groups”, 
and the Gap.  The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Teaching practices are 
statistically  more  significant  than  national  education,  a  variable  usually  seen  to  be  the  main 
determinant of trust.   The relationship is also economically sizeable.  Respectively 33 percent and 32 
percent of the cross-country variation in generalized trust is explained by the variation in “Always 
take notes from the board” and “Gap between Lecture and Work in groups”.  An increase by one 
standard deviation in “Always takes notes from the board” is associated with a rise by 5.7 percentage 
points in generalized trust.  Income per capita and average years of schooling are also statistically 
significant determinants of generalized trust in a cross-section of countries.  
Columns 4-6 of Table 3 show that teaching practices are also significantly related to civic life, 
measured as the percentage of citizens registered in an association in the WVS 2000.  In particular, 
there is a negative and statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) relationship between the share 
who  “always  take  notes  from  the  board”  and  association  membership.  Taken  alone,  this  share 
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Table 4 documents the effects of teaching practices on attitudes toward officials.  One might 
expect vertical teaching to fuel a sense of subordination of citizens to officials, breeding distrust in 
politics and the state.  In contrast, horizontal teaching might encourage a feeling of belonging to the 
same  community  and  an  expectation  of  accountability  from  the  official.    We  investigate  this 
hypothesis by using the International Social Survey Program 2006 devoted to the role of government.  
The ISSP 2006 covers a large set of countries for which we have data on teaching practices.  We use 
the  following  related  questions:  “Most  civil  servants  can  be  trusted  to  do  what  is  best  for  the 
country”.    The  answers  range  from  1  for  Strongly  Agree,  2  for  Agree,  3  for  Neither  Agree  nor 
Disagree,  4  for  Disagree  and  5  for  Strongly  Disagree.    The  second  question  is  related  to  the 
perception of fairness of civil servants: “In your opinion, how often do public officials deal fairly with 
people like you?”.  The answers range from 1 for Almost always, 2 for Often, 3 for Occasionally, 4 for 
Seldom and 5 for Almost never.  We use the country average of the answers to these two questions.  
Table  4  shows  that  the  variables  trust  in  civil  servants  and  belief  in  their  fairness  are 
negatively  related  to  the  share  of  students  who  “always  take  notes  from  the  board”;  both 
relationships are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  In contrast, horizontal teaching does   15 
not  display  any  significant  relationship  with  attitudes  toward  civil  servants.    To  interpret  the 
magnitude of the effect, we recode the attitudes toward civil servants.  Take the question “In your 
opinion, how often do public officials deal fairly with people like you?”.  We create an indicator of 
the fairness of civil servants equal to 1 if the answers are “Almost always” and “Often”, and to 0 
otherwise.  We then use the country average share of this variable as the left hand side variable.  All 
the controls are the same as in Table 4.  An increase by ten percentage points in the share of 
students who always take notes from the board is associated with a fall of 6.7 percentage points in 
the share of respondents who believe that civil servants treat them fairly. 
Columns 7-9 of Table 4 show that vertical teaching is also associated with a more widespread 
feeling of corruption from the elites.  From the ISSP 1996, we use the following question on the 
perception of corruption of civil servants: “In your opinion, how many public officials are involved in 
corruption?”.  The answers range from 1 for Almost None, 2 for A few, 3 for Quite a lot, and 4 for 
Almost all.  This index of perception of corruption is higher when more students “always take notes 
from the board” as well as when the Gap is higher.  The coefficients are statistically significant at the 
1 percent level.   
2.3.2 Organization of firms  
This section evaluates the consequences of teaching practices for the organization of firms 
and the quality of labor relations.  We assess whether a society emphasizing horizontal teaching also 
promotes  horizontal  organization  of  work  in  firms.    Perhaps  citizens  who  have  been  trained  to 
cooperate at schools are also more likely to cooperate at work.  Conversely, vertical teaching might 
encourage  hierarchical  relationships  outside  of  school,  and  in  particular  at  work.  We  test  this 
prediction by looking at three cross-country indicators on firm organization.  
Figure  4  shows  the  cross-country  relationship  between  the  Gap  between  Vertical  and 
Horizontal teaching and decentralization of firms.  Decentralization is measured using the following 
question from the Global Competitiveness Report 2009 (GCR): “In your country, how do you assess 
the  willingness  to  delegate  authority  to  subordinates?  1  =  low:  top  management  controls  all 
important decisions; 7 = high: authority is mostly delegated to business unit heads and other lower-
level managers”.  The GCR is based on a survey given to a representative sample of managers in all 
the countries for which we have indicators of teaching practices.  This indicator of delegation has 
been  found  by  Bloom  and  Van  Reenen  (2010)  to  be  highly  correlated  with  their  cross-country 
measure  of  decentralization  in  firms.    Figure  4  shows  a  strong  negative  relation  between  this 
indicator of decentralization and the gap between Vertical and Horizontal teaching.  Both Anglo-  16 
Saxon and Scandinavian firms are much more decentralized than the European ones, and especially 
the Mediterranean and the East European ones, paralleling the patterns in teaching practices.    
Figure 4 – Decentralization of firms 
 
 
Table 5 – Col. 1-3 confirm that the organization of firms is associated with teaching practices, 
even with additional controls.  Delegation of authority is lower when more students “always take 
notes from the board” or when the Gap between vertical and horizontal teaching is higher.  The 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 or 5 percent.  Taken alone, vertical teaching explains a 
quarter of the cross-country dispersion in the delegation of authority. 
  
Table 5 – Col. 4-6 provide the complementary picture based on worker views on their degree 
of autonomy in the organization of their daily work.  The question is taken from the European Social 
Survey  and  reads:  “When  you  think  about  your  work,  how  much  freedom  do  you  have  in  the 
organizations of your tasks”.  The answer ranges from 1 for no freedom at all to 10 for total freedom.  
The results show that workplace autonomy is negatively and significantly related to the share who 
“always take notes from the board” and to the Gap between vertical and horizontal teaching. 
 
  We also investigate how these differences in teaching practices relate to the quality of labor 
relations. From the GCR 2009, we use the question: «How would you characterize labor-employer   17 
relations in your country? 1 = generally confrontational; 7 = generally cooperative.”  Since the data 
come from the GCR, this question captures the point of view of managers and executives.  
 
Figure 5 – Quality of labor relations 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that countries in which students always take notes from the board do not 
have cooperative labor relations.  Twenty eight percent of the cross-country variation in the quality 
of labor relations is explained by vertical teaching.  Table 5 tests the robustness of this relationship 
when we include additional controls.  Columns 7-9 show that the quality of labor relations is reduced 
when vertical teaching dominates.  The correlation is the most significant with the gap between the 
time spent in vertical and horizontal teaching.   
2.3.3 The Quality of Institutions   
  We  conclude  this  section  by  looking  at  the  relationship  between  teaching  practices  and 
institutions.  We  first  explore  the  relationship  between  teaching  practices  and  the  extent  of 
regulation  of  the  society.    One  might  expect  vertical  teaching  to  be  associated  with  a  more 
hierarchical  organization  of  the  state.    We  look  at  this  using  two  main  indicators.  The  first  is 
government  effectiveness,  measured  as  the  average  of  the  Kaufmann  government  effectiveness 
index between 1998 and 2007 (see Kaufmann et al., 2008).  This measure captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of civil service, and its degree of independence from political   18 
pressures,  the  quality  of  policy  formulation  and  implementation,  and  the  credibility  of  the 
government’s commitment to such policies.  The range of the score is from −2.5 to +2.5, with a 
higher  score  indicating  greater  government  effectiveness.    The  second  institutional  measure  is 
regulatory intensity, which we measure as the number of steps for starting a new business from 
Djankov et al. (2002).   
Table 6 – Col. 1-3 show that government effectiveness is lower in countries where vertical 
teaching  predominates.  The  correlation  patterns  are  statistically  significant  and  economically 
sizeable.  Vertical  teaching  alone  can  explain  18.3  percent  of  the  cross-country  variation  in 
government effectiveness.   Table 6 – Col. 4-6 reports the relationship between entry regulation and 
teaching practices.  Regulation is the more stringent in countries where more students “always take 
notes from the board”; the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
3. Teaching practices and Student Beliefs 
The  correlations  in  the  aggregate  data  are  suggestive,  but  they  leave  issues  of  omitted 
variables and causality quite open.  To address these issues, this section examines the relationship 
between teaching practices and social capital by using micro data on students’ beliefs in cooperation 
from the CES. Using micro data first allows to control for country fixed effect, making it possible to 
disentangle the role of teaching practices from national educational policies or national social capital 
by looking at variation across schools and teachers.  We show that not only countries but also 
schools and teachers differ a lot in their reliance on what we call vertical and horizontal teaching 
practices.  We also show that teaching practices vary considerably among teachers within schools. 
We discuss the determinants of teaching practices between and within schools using our micro data, 
where an observation is a student teacher pair.  
We then turn to estimating the relationship between teaching practices and student beliefs 
using OLS specification. We control for several student, teacher and school characteristics, including 
the teacher and school level of social capital. This allows us to disentangle the role of teaching 
practices from other channel of transmission of social capital through teacher or peer effects. We 
find  a  significant  relationship  between  those  practices  and  various  dimensions  of  student  social 
capital,  including  beliefs  in  cooperation  with  other  students  and  with  teachers,  association 
membership, trust in institutions, and indexes of participation in the civil society.     19 
Because the OLS regressions control for school and teacher social capital, as well as a number 
of school characteristics, they alleviate the concern that both student beliefs and teaching practices 
are driven by community social capital.  Yet they do not fully resolve it because teachers and their 
practices might be selected or self-selected based on community social capital, and because teachers 
can  adjust  their  practices  to  student  characteristics.    We  then  estimate  instrumental-variables 
models, using teacher gender and teacher interest in additional instructional time as instruments.  
Over-identification tests show that that these instruments are valid.   The results of 2SLS tell us that 
teaching practices have an independent and statistically significant causal effect on student beliefs.  
3.1. Database on Teaching Practices and Student Beliefs 
Our analysis of the association between teaching practices and student social capital draw on 
the “Civic Education Study” (CES). In addition to the teaching practices already presented in section 
2.1, the CES measures various dimensions of civic knowledge, including concepts of democracy and 
citizenship, attitudes to institutions, trust and civic behavior, as well as beliefs about cooperation 
among  students  and  cooperation  between  students  and  teachers.    In  addition  to  the  individual 
student survey, the CES includes school-principal and teacher background questionnaires.  
At the student level, in addition to questions about beliefs discussed below, the measured 
characteristics include age, gender and immigration status (dummy equal 1 if the student is born 
abroad and 0 otherwise).  We control for the socioeconomic background of the parents by including 
their education, equal to 1 for No elementary school, 2 for Completed elementary school, 3 for High 
School, 4 for Completed High School, 5 Higher technical education, 6 for Some college – university 
degree, and 7 for Graduate degree. We also use student responses on the number of books at home, 
equal to 1 for None, 2 for One-Ten books, 3 for Eleven-Fifty Books, 4 for Fifty one- One hundred 
books, 5 for One-hundred and one-Two hundreds books, and 6 for More than two hundred books.  
This variable has been found to be a more cross-country comparable measure of family background 
than  parental  education,  and  is  the  single  most  important  predictor  of  student  performance 
(Hanushek and Woesmann, 2010).  Schuetz et al (2008) show that the number of books at home is a 
good proxy for household income, which is not reported in the CES.   
At the teacher level, the survey includes information on teacher’s age, gender, highest level 
of formal education, and years of experience.  The CES samples for each class all the teachers whose 
topic is related to civic knowledge. This includes mostly fields in humanities and social sciences but 
excludes biology, maths, and sciences. In all regression we control for the field taught by the teacher.    20 
We  also  use  questions  about  teachers’  beliefs  in  cooperation  as  proxies  for  their  social 
capital, which they might transmit to students.  If geographic mobility of teachers is low, their level of 
social capital might be a proxy for the local social capital in the area where students live.  We use this 
information as an additional control to isolate the specific role of teaching practices on student 
beliefs, which roughly holds constant social capital in the geographic location, and thus, perhaps, in 
the family.     
We measure teachers’ social capital with the following questions they answer on confidence: 
“How much confidence do you have in the political system?”, “How much confidence do you have in 
elections?”, “How much confidence do you have in the judicial system?”, “How much confidence do 
you have in immigration?”, “How much confidence do you have in social welfare?”, “How much 
confidence  do  you  have  in  labor  unions?”.  The  answers  equal  1  for  “Not  at  all”,  2  for  “Little 
confidence”, 3 for “Confident” and 4 for “Very confident”.  We create an index of “Teacher’s social 
capital” by taking the average of these answers, which ranges between 1 and 4.  
We also control for the educational goal of the teacher. We use the following two questions: 
“In our school, students learn to understand people who have different ideas/point of views” and “In 
our school, students learn to cooperate in groups with other students”. The answers range from 1 for 
Strongly Disagree to 4 for Strongly Agree. We create an index of “Teacher Beliefs in Cooperation” as 
the average of those two answers. This variable is important to identify the independent component 
of the teaching practice from the more general teacher behavior or belief about cooperation at 
school. This variable could also address the concern that the students answer about cooperation at 
school are just mirror what the teacher tells them.  
In addition, we use data on teacher perception of whether more instructional time is needed.  
The question reads: “In your view, what need to be improved about education in your school: More 
instructional time for education?”. The variable equals 1 if the teacher mentions this item among the 
three most important things to improve and zero otherwise (the other potential items are more 
materials  and  textbooks,  additional  training  in  teaching  methods,  more  cooperation  between 
teachers, more opportunities for special projects, more opportunities for school decisions).   Unlike 
the other items, the demand for more instructional time for education is highly correlated with both 
the practices “students work in groups” and “teacher lectures”.    
At the school level, the school principal’s questionnaire includes the size of the class being 
interviewed and whether the school is public or private. The questionnaire also reports the fraction 
of students in the school from low socio-economic backgrounds. This question is not reported for all 
countries (in particular in Great Britain and the United States) and will be used only for a robustness   21 
check.  We also include a measure of the social capital at the school level. The school-principal survey 
reports the following question: “How frequently each of the following occurs at your school? a) 
Vandalism,  b)  Drugs,  c)  Truancy,  d)  Racism,  e)  Religious  intolerance,  f)  Alcohol,  g)  Bullying,  h) 
Violence”. For each item, the answer equal 1 for never, 2 for sometime, and 3 for Often. We change 
the order of the scale so that a higher score indicates a higher level of social capital. These measures 
are used as an additional control for the local level of social capital and to disentangle teaching 
practices from the school environment.  Finally, we also include a question on the goal of the school 
according to the school-principal: “Students in this school learn to understand people who have 
different ideas” and “Students in this school learn to cooperate in groups with other students”. The 
answer range from 1 for strongly disagree to 4 for strongly agree. This question is used to distinguish 
the role of teaching practice from alternative channels to promote cooperation within the school.  
Table A1 in the Appendix presents the definition and descriptive statistics of all the variables 
we use from the CES.  The sample covers 3,934 schools, with an average of 150 schools per country, 
3,413 students per country, and an average of 1.68 teachers per student. Table A2 in Appendix 
reports  the  descriptive  statistics  for  the  mean  and  standard  deviation  of  teaching  practices  per 
country from the CES.  Countries differ substantially in the extent of variation in teaching practices 
across  schools.  Nordic  countries  like  Denmark,  Norway  or  Sweden,  are  characterized  by  lower 
variation across schools in the practice “teacher lectures”, followed by Germany, Switzerland and 
Germany. Eastern European countries display above average variation in lecturing.  United Kingdom 
and the United States are close to the cross-country average.   
 
3.2 Determinants of teaching practices: variation across and within schools 
We begin by discussing the sources of variation in teaching practices across schools  and 
within  schools.  We  look  at  the  relationship  between  teaching  practices  and  observable 
characteristics at the class and schools levels.   The dependent variable is the teaching practice of a 
given teacher, with each student of that teacher entering as a separate observation.  We control for 
the individual characteristics of each student in the class of the teacher, including gender, immigrant 
origin, age, education level of the parents, and the number of books at home.  We also include the 
individual characteristics of the teacher: age, gender, level of education, years of experience, as well 
as the social capital of the teacher.  Finally, we include the average characteristics of the school: 
whether the school is public or private and the size of the classroom. 
 Table 8 presents the results of regressing teaching practices “Teacher Lectures” and “Work 
in  groups”  on  the  set  of  observables  characteristics  of  the  teachers,  the  school  and  the  family   22 
background of the students. We run OLS regressions with country fixed effects to focus on within 
country variation across schools in Columns 1 and 2, and include school fixed effects to look at 
variation within schools in Columns 3 and 4.  We cluster standard errors at the student level. The 
results are unchanged by clustering standard errors at the teacher or school level.   
Table 8, Columns 1 and 2, shows that teaching practices are correlated with some observable 
characteristics of children and schools.  “Students work in groups” rises with mother’s education and 
teacher gender.  “Teacher Lectures” falls with immigrant status of the student, teacher gender, and 
the fraction  of students in the school from low socio-economic backgrounds.  It also rises with 
teacher social capital.   The strongest and most consistent predictor of teaching practices appears to 
be the teacher’s gender: women are more likely to rely on horizontal, and less likely on vertical, 
teaching practices.  Later we use teacher gender as an instrument for teaching practices.  We also 
find a statistically significant relationship between the teacher demand for additional instructional 
time and teaching practices. The teachers who feel that they need more instructional time are more 
likely to lecture, and are less likely to ask their students to work in groups.  This relationship still 
holds when we control for the total instructional time by class and whatever the field taught by the 
teacher.  We use this indicator of teacher wishes as the second instrument, as well as test its validity.  
Table 8 – Columns 3 and 4 - describe the variation in teaching practices within schools by 
including  school  fixed  effects.  We  restrict  the  sample  to  the  classrooms  for  which  we  have 
observation of teaching practices for multiple teachers. (Table A2 shows that there is still substantial 
variation  in  teaching  practices  within  classrooms.)    Columns  3  and  4  show  that  the  variation  in 
teaching  practices  within  the  same  class  mostly  depends  on  teacher  characteristics.    We  speak 
interchangeably of classes and schools since the CES samples one class per school and interviews a 
sub-sample of students within that single classroom. Within a class, the practice “Students work in 
groups”  rises  with  teacher  belief  that  her  goal  is  to  teach  children  to  cooperate,  with  teacher 
education, and with teacher experience. Horizontal teaching is still positively correlated with teacher 
gender  and  negatively  correlated  with  the  demand  for  more  instructional  time.  Conversely,  the 
practice “Teacher lectures” falls with female gender and teacher inclination to teach cooperation, 
and rises with the teacher feeling of being time constrained. These characteristics remain statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. But the coefficient is smaller in the within schools regressions than 
in  the  between  schools  regressions.  The  student  characteristics  are  irrelevant  in  within  schools 
regressions since the teachers face the same students by design.   
We find substantial variation in teaching practices both between and within schools. These 
results indicate that teaching practices are not just a mirror of the local level of social capital, or the   23 
mirror of the national or school curricula. The database does not make it possible to exploit the 
variation in teaching practices within the same classrooms though. The reason is that we do not have 
multiple combinations of students allocated to different teachers in a given class.  The CES randomly 
samples students from a given classroom, and interview exactly the same set of teachers for all the 
students sampled. We thus do not get any source of variation in the students’ beliefs due to different 
allocation  of  students  to  teachers  within  the  same  classroom.  The  regressions  relating  teaching 
practices and student’s beliefs below thus exploit variation across schools.     
3.3 Teaching practices and individual Student Beliefs: OLS estimates  
3.3.1 Basic OLS estimates 
We start with OLS regressions of student beliefs on teaching practices with various controls.  
When we have data on multiple teachers for the same student, we use each pair as a separate 
observation.  We cluster standard errors at the student level. The results are similar when we cluster 
at  the  school  level.  The  results  are  not  markedly  different  when  we  consider  the  average 
characteristics across different teachers of a given student, rather than treating each teacher student 
pair as a separate observation.  The relationship between student beliefs and teaching practices is 
not statistically significant, however, when we run the estimates with school fixed effects, i.e., look at 
the role of variation in teaching practices within a school.  We include country fixed effects in all the 
regressions.  We thus exploit the variation in teaching practices across schools, making it possible to 
disentangle  the  specific  role  of  teaching  practices  on  students’  beliefs  from  other  national 
characteristics such as social capital or institutions.  
We  first  estimate  the  relationship  between  student  beliefs  about  cooperation  among 
themselves and teaching practices.  From the student survey, we use the following two questions:     
“The goal of education is to understand people with different ideas” and “The goal of education is to 
learn how to cooperate in groups with other students”. The answers range from 1 for Strongly 
Disagree, 2 for Disagree, 3 for Agree and 4 for Strongly Agree.  The indicator “Belief in cooperation 
between students” takes for each student the average of the two answers, ranging from 1 to 4. 
The OLS results for student belief in cooperation with other students are reported in Table 9.  
Column 1 shows that this belief is positively related to “Students work in groups,” and the coefficient 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  In contrast, the belief in cooperation among students 
is negatively related to “Teacher lectures.”  The coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level.  There are a number of other important effects.  Female students are firmer 
believers in cooperation with other students, as are students coming from households with more   24 
books. Finally, this belief is significantly stronger among students in public schools.   We do not 
pursue these interesting results here, but note that the student gender result is in line with Groson 
and Gneezy’s (2009) finding of important gender differences in experimental public good games.  
How large are the parameter estimates on teaching practices?  Raising “Students work in 
groups” by one point increases the belief in cooperation among students by 0.011, or 2.44 percent of 
the standard deviation.  Raising “Teacher lectures” by one point decreases that belief by 0.008, or 
2.03 percent of the standard deviation.  These effects appear modest, but perhaps not compared to 
those  of  the  other  teacher  and  school  characteristics.    For  example,  the  class  size  needs  to  be 
reduced by a third to increase the belief in cooperation among students by 0.01 point.   
The second aspect of student social capital is belief in cooperation with their teachers. We 
use the following related questions from the student questionnaire: “Are students encouraged to 
make up their own opinion?”, “Do teacher respect your opinion?”, “Do you feel free to express 
opinions in class?”, “Do you feel free to openly disagree with the teacher?”.  The answers range from 
1 for strongly disagree, 2 for disagree, 3 for agree, to 4 for strongly agree.   We use these answers to 
create an index “Belief in cooperation between students and teachers”, which ranges from 1 to 4.  
Table 9  - Column 3 shows that the belief in cooperation with teachers is positively and 
significantly (at the 1 percent level) related to “Students work in groups.”  A one point increase in this 
practice is associated with a rise by 0.0212 in the belief in cooperation with teachers, or 3.6 percent 
of a standard deviation.  Table 9 - Column 4 shows a negative and statistically significant at the 1 
percent  level  relationship  between  student  “Belief  in  cooperation  with  teachers”  and  “Teacher 
lectures”.  Raising “Teacher lectures” by one point is associated with a drop of 0.006 in the “Belief in 
cooperation  between  students  and  teachers”,  or  1.02  percent  of  a  standard  deviation.    Other 
important influences on student belief in cooperation with teachers include student gender, father’s 
education,  the  number  of  books  at  home,  teacher’s  age,  teacher’s  education  (which  enters 
negatively!), teacher’s experience (which enters negatively), class size, teacher’s attitude towards 
promoting cooperation (which enters positively), and school social capital (which enters positively).  
The  third  dimension  of  students’  social  capital  is  participation  in  civic  life.    Table  10  – 
Columns 1 and 2 show the relationship between teaching practices and the involvement of students 
in associations.  The student survey brings up 15 organizations: “Have you ever participated in: A 
student council? A youth organization? A school newspaper? An environmental organization? A U.N 
or UNESCO Club? A Student exchange program? A Human Rights Organization? A Group Conducting  
Activities? A Charity Collecting ? A boy or girl scout group? A cultural association? A computer club? 
An art, drama or music association? A Sport Organization? An association supported by a religious   25 
group?“  For each association, the answer is 1 if the respondent participates and 0 otherwise.  We 
sum up the answers to get a measure of Association membership, varying between 0 and 15. 
Table  10  shows  that  Association  membership  is  positively  related  to  “Students  work  in 
groups”; the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (Column 1).  In contrast, 
Column 2 shows a negative relationship between Association membership and “Teachers  lectures”; 
although the coefficient is not statistically significant.  Raising by one point “Students work in groups” 
increases the number of memberships by 0.073, which is 5.18 percent of a standard deviation.  The 
other statistically significant determinants of memberships are student gender, father’s and mother’s 
education, the number of books at home, teacher education (weakly), class size and public status of 
the school, but teaching practices have a large effect compared, for example, to class size.   
Finally, we look at the relationship between teaching practices and trust in institutions.  From 
the CES, we use the following questions: “How much confidence do you have in: i) Courts? , ii) The 
Police?, iii) Education institutions/Schools? , iv) Government?, v) Parliament?”.  The answers range 
from 1 for “Not at all”, 2 for “Little confidence”, 3 for “Confident” and 4 for “Very confident”.  We 
take the average of these four answers to construct an index of “Trust”, ranging between 1 and 4.  
Table 10 – Columns 3 and 4 show that “Trust” is positively related to “work in groups” but 
not related to “teacher lectures.”  The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for 
“work in groups. The evidence on trust is a bit weaker than that on other measures of social capital, 
yet still continues to point in the direction of importance of teaching practices, and in particular of 
the benefits of horizontal teaching methods, and costs of vertical ones, for social capital.  
Table 11 concludes this section by looking at more general questions on student beliefs 
about civic life and cooperation outside the school. One concern with the previous questions on 
cooperation is that they are school centered. The students might just answer what the teachers are 
expecting them to say. Questions on their civic culture outside the school should be less subject to 
this concern. We measure cooperation in the civil society outside the school with the following list of 
questions: “ “To become a good citizen, how important it is to you to: i) participate in activities to 
benefit people in the community, ii) take part in activities promoting human rights? Iii) take part in 
activities to protect the environment? iv) participate in a peaceful protest against a law considered as 
unjust?”. The answers range from 1 for Not important to 4 for Very important. We create an index of 
Participation in the social life by taking the average of those questions.   
We measure participation in political life outside the school with the questions: “To become 
a good citizen, how important is it for you to:  a) vote in every election? Ii) join a political party? Iii)   26 
follow political issues in the newspaper, on the radio or on TV?” The answers range from 1 for Not 
important to 4 for Very important. We also consider two questions related to l democracy. The first 
question reads:” When everyone has the right to express their opinion freely that is: i) very bad, ii) 
somewhat bad, iii) somewhat good, iv) very good , for democracy?”. The second question is “When 
many different organizations are available for people who wish to belong to them, that is i) very bad, 
ii)  somewhat  bad,  iii)  somewhat  good,  iv)  very  good,  for  democracy?.  We  create  an  index 
Participation in the political life by taking the average of those questions.  Table 11 shows that 
“Participation in social life” and “Participation in political life” are positively related to “work in 
groups” and negatively related to “teacher lectures.”  The coefficient is statistically significant at the 
1 percent level for “work in groups.”, and at 5 percent for “teacher lectures”.  The influence of 
teaching practices on students’ answer about social capital goes beyond cooperation at school.  
3.3.2 The Effects of Teaching practices on Students from Different Backgrounds  
We  briefly  assess  whether  the  relation  between  teaching  practice  and  social  capital  is 
different for different groups of students.  We compare the relationship in schools with few versus 
many students from poor socioeconomic backgrounds.  From the school principal surveys, we can 
compute  the  national  average  share  of  students  from  low  socioeconomic  backgrounds  across 
schools,  and  distinguish  schools  that  are  above  or  below  this  threshold.    We  do  not  use  this 
characteristic in the previous estimate due to the lack of data for four countries of the sample.  We 
obtain  similar  results  when  we  use  the  class  average  number  of  books  relative  to  the  national 
average as an indicator for poor socioeconomic background.   
Table 6 shows that the effect of teaching practices on student beliefs in cooperation among 
themselves and with teachers is particularly pronounced in schools with a high share of students 
from  low  socioeconomic  backgrounds.  The  coefficients  on  teaching  practices  are  statistically 
significant in these schools, but not in schools with below average share of students from poor 
backgrounds.  We get similar results for the student level of trust and association memberships.  
These results might be particularly interesting if communities are particularly focuses on raising the 
level of social capital of students from low socioeconomic backgrounds.   
We also distinguish the role of teaching policies in countries and schools displaying a above 
average variation in teaching practices, or in private schools. We expect in this case the effect of 
teaching practices to be bigger since teachers have more latitude in choosing their practice.  
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3.4 Identification: IV estimates 
So far, all the regressions control for country fixed effects, identifying the effects of teaching 
practices from teacher differences.  This strategy makes it possible to disentangle the role of the 
teacher (or the school) from national educational policies or national social capital.  But teaching 
practices might still reflect the beliefs of the parents or of the local community, even after controlling 
for teacher and school social capital.  Teaching practices might also be influenced by student beliefs 
in cooperation as the teachers adjust their practices to their audience. We address those concerns by 
instrumenting teaching practices. We use two instruments: teacher gender and teacher interest in 
more instructional time.  Female teachers might be more interesting in group projects and student 
cooperation.  Teachers committed to completing the curriculum and feeling time pressure might be 
especially focused on lecturing rather that student working in groups.  Indeed, we know from Table 8 
that teacher gender and interest in additional instructional time are significant predictors of teaching 
practices.   We discuss the validity of these instruments below. In particular, we perform F-tests to 
test the hypothesis of weak instruments and over-identification tests to check the exogeneity of the 
instruments.   
The first issue is whether our instruments are weak.  Recall from the first stage estimate in 
Table 8 that teacher gender and teacher interest in more instructional time are both significant 
predictors of teaching practices.  A female teacher is associated with an increase by 0.22 points in the 
frequency of the practice “Students work in groups”, which corresponds to 32.25 percent of the 
standard deviation in this teaching practice.  The relationship is statistically highly significant at the 1 
percent level. A female teacher is also associated with a decrease by 0.11 points in the practice 
“Teacher  lectures”,  which  is  12.31  percent  of  the  standard  deviation  of  this  practice.    Teacher 
interest in more instructional time is also highly correlated with the teaching practice chosen by the 
teacher. Teachers who express this interest are more likely to lecture either because they like this 
teaching practice or because they feel time constrained. Importantly, the teacher interest in more 
instructional time is a significant predictor of the teaching practices even when controlling for total 
instructional time at the school level.  
We provide formal tests of weak instruments at the bottom of the 2SLS estimates in Table 
13. We do not report the first stage estimates for each question on student beliefs since these 
estimates remain approximately unchanged compared to Table 8 (Columns 1 for “Students work in 
groups” and Column 2 for “Teacher lectures”).   (Only the number of observations changes slightly 
across questions.)  We report the F-test of weak instruments for each question though.  In all cases, 
the F-tests are highly significant and largely reject the hypothesis of weak instruments. This result is   28 
consistent with the first stage estimates in Table 8 showing that teacher gender and instructional 
time were highly correlated with teaching methods.   
The second issue is whether the instruments are exogenous relative to student beliefs and 
uncorrelated with the error term.  Unfortunately, we do not have teachers and students randomly 
assigned to each other, so one can come up with a variety of alternative theories.   For example, 
teacher interest in more instructional time could depend on the social capital of the students.  The 
female teacher is more immune to this criticism and is obviously exogeneous with regard to the 
social capital of the students.  Furthermore, we do not find any correlation across schools between 
the share of female teachers and the characteristics of the classrooms (share of girls, education of 
parents,  share  of  poor  socio-economic  background…),  mitigating  the  concern  of  self-sorting  of 
female teachers into specific schools.  We also recall that, as shown in Table 8, teacher gender and 
teacher interest in additional instructional time predict teaching practices within and not just across 
schools.  This piece of evidence suggests that these variables reflect teacher preferences and styles 
rather than characteristics of the communities or schools in which the teachers are employed.   
We  are  also  concerned  that  the  instrument  teacher  gender  might  violate  the  exclusion 
restriction.  Female  teachers  might  build  up  student  social  capital  by  being  broadly  sympathetic, 
rather than through particular teaching methods (even controlling for teacher belief that the goal of 
education is to promote cooperation). To sort out these concerns, we perform over-identification 
tests of the exogeneity of instruments for each question on student beliefs.  Since we use robust 
standard errors, we use Wooldridge’s robust score test of over-identification restrictions.  The p-
value of the over-identification tests are reported at the bottom of Table 13.  In all cases, the p-
values are higher than the 10 percent level and we cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments 
are exogenous and uncorrelated with the error term.  These over-identification tests also suggest 
that instrumental variables work only through teaching practices, giving us additional confidence in 
our instruments.  
Table 13 reports that the second stage estimates are statistically significant at the 1 or 5 
percent level for “Cooperation among students”, “Participation in political life” and “Participation in 
social life”, and significant at the 10 percent level for “Cooperation with teachers” (Col. 2). When 
significant, the size of the 2SLS coefficients are bigger than the previous OLS estimates, suggesting 
that the OLS estimates were downward biased by the endogeneity of the teaching practices relative 
to those students’ beliefs.  We have also checked the robustness of our results by including the 
official time of instruction by school ((ln)-number of weeks of instruction and (ln)-number of classes 
by weeks). These measures could be correlated with the teacher demand for more instructional   29 
time.  The number of observations drops sharply due to missing data for some countries.  But we do 
not  find  any  significant  change  in  the  2SLS  estimates.  These  results  point  to  the  direction  of  a 
significant causal effect of teaching practices on student’s social capital.  
  The results in Table 13 provide some evidence that the influence of teaching practices on 
student  beliefs  is  not  merely  a  correlation,  but  is causal.    The evidence  indicates  that  changing 
teaching practices might be conducive to building the social capital of students in a classroom, quite 
aside from the social capital of the community they live in.  
4. Teaching practices and Cognitive skills  
One  potential  reaction  to  our  findings  is  that  the  acquisition  of  social  capital  through 
horizontal teaching practices comes at the expense of substantive knowledge.  Alternatively, the 
teaching practices that enhance social capital might encourage cognitive performance as well.  This 
section addresses this question both at the individual and country level.  We use the TIMSS database 
for the micro estimates (recall that we could not use TIMSS to study beliefs because it does not 
record them). TIMSS report test scores in mathematics for students in 8
th Grade, along with teaching 
practices  and  student  backgrounds.    TIMSS  math  performance  is  measured  on  an  international 
achievement scale with the mean of 500 and the standard deviation of 100.  These achievement 
tests are evidently representative of national cognitive skills and have been endorsed by all the 
participating  countries  (see  Martin  and  Kelly  1997).      We  measure  teaching  practices  using  the 
variables: “Students take notes from the board” and “Students work in groups” from TIMSS.  Recall 
that these variables range from 1 for Never, 2 for Sometimes, 3 for Often, to 4 for All the time.  We 
also consider dummies for measuring the frequency of each teaching practice to detect potential 
non-monotonic effects. 
 
The regressions control for several student, teacher, and school characteristics. From the 
student survey, we use information on family background, including parental education and the 
number of books at home.  We also include student age, as well as dummies for whether the student 
was born abroad and whether she is a girl.  From the teacher survey, we include the teacher’s age, 
gender, highest level of formal education, and years of experience.  We also use the size of the 
classroom in which that teacher teaches that student.  From the school principal’s survey, we use 
variables indicating the shortage of instruction materials in the school (equal to 1 for None, 2 for A 
little, 3 for Some, and 4 for A lot) and the community location of the school (1 for Geographically 
isolated area, 2 for Village or rural area, 3 for On the outskirts of a city, and 4 for Center of the city).      30 
Table 14 presents the OLS micro estimates. All the regressions control for  country fixed 
effects. Column 1 shows that “Take notes from the board” is statistically significantly negatively 
related to math performance.  However, Column 2 shows the same negative relationship between 
math test scores and “Students work in groups.”  The relationships for the two teaching practices are 
both statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  However, the coefficient on “Students work in 
groups” is lower than that on “Take notes from the board.”   This evidence suggests that it might be 
useful to look for non-monotonic effects of teaching practices.  
We do so by including in the regressions dummies for each frequency  of each teaching 
practice. We take the frequency “Never” as the reference group. Column 3 shows that taking notes 
from  the  board  “Sometimes”  instead  of  “Never”  is  positively  related  to  math  performance.  
However, the relationship between math test scores and taking notes from the board “Often” and 
“Always” is negative. Column 4 shows that a similar non-monotonic pattern emerges between math 
performance and the frequency with which “Students work in groups”. 
The  size  of  the  coefficients  on  teaching  practices  is  quite  substantial.  Consider  the 
coefficients on the dummies for the frequency of each teaching practice (Columns 3 and 4).  Students 
who work in groups “Sometimes” perform 7.88 test-score points better than students who “Never” 
work in groups.  This effect is of the same order of magnitude as having a teaching with one higher 
educational  degree,  the  only  other  teacher  characteristic  to  be  statistically  significant  at  the  1 
percent level.  This effect is comparable to an increase of one and a half steps in the education of the 
mother  or  the  father.    Working  in  groups  “Often”,  instead  of  “Never”,  has  a  negative  but  not 
statistically  significant  effect  on  test  performance.    But  students  who  “Always”  work  in  groups 
perform 23.82 test score points lower than students who “Never” work in groups.  This effect is twice 
as large as that of being an immigrant.  The magnitude of the coefficients on “Taking notes from the 
board” is smaller.  Students who take notes from the board “Sometimes” instead of “Never” do not 
significantly improve their test scores.  Yet students who take notes “Often” or “Always” perform 
10.97 and 15.84 points lower than students who “Never” take notes from the board.  
Cognitive skills are not the focus of this paper, and we cannot provide as detailed analysis of 
causality in the relationship between teaching practices and cognitive skills.  We have used teacher 
gender as an instrument and confirmed the OLS results; the coefficients on teaching practices remain 
significant in 2SLS.  However, because we have changed data bases, we do not have information on 
teacher interest in additional instructional time.  
We conclude by looking at the aggregate implications of teaching practices for cognitive 
skills.  For the macro estimates, we compute country average tests scores from TIMSS.  We also use   31 
the information on cognitive tests of 15 year old students provided by PISA 2000 and 2003.  From 
PISA, we also take the country’s share of repeaters in secondary schools and the country average 
value of the PISA index on socio-economic inequality in cognitive scores.  This index measures the 
effect of the socioeconomic background of each student on his cognitive tests. The background 
includes income and the level of education of the family.  The higher is the index, the higher is the 
role played by the socioeconomic background of the student in his test scores.  We average the 
indices at the country level.  
Table 15 presents the OLS estimates of cognitive skills controlling for income per capita and 
school expenditure.  We report the results for the tests score in mathematics from TIMSS 1995.  We 
do not find a statistically significant relationship between test scores and teaching practices.  We 
have checked with PISA cognitive tests, without finding any effects either.  Table 15 also shows that 
the average years of education are negatively related to vertical teaching.  This seems to suggest that 
even though teaching practices do not directly affect cognitive skills at a given grade, they might 
influence the selection of students into upper grades. 
Table 16 documents the effects of teaching practices for the share of repeaters and the index 
of socioeconomic inequality.  It is consistent with the previous results.  More vertical teaching is 
associated  with  a  higher  share  of  repeaters  in  secondary  schools  and  a  higher  weight  of  socio-
economic backgrounds.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have presented a great deal of empirical evidence documenting the connection between 
teaching capital and social capital.  In a cross-section of countries, teaching practices are associated 
both with beliefs supporting social capital, and several outcomes bearing on the organization of firms 
and  governments.    In  the  micro  data,  we  have  documented  a  significant  relationship  between 
teaching practices and social capital-supporting beliefs for a sample of about 70,000 students, 7,000 
teachers and 4,000 schools from about 23 countries.  Horizontal teaching practices, such as working 
in groups, seem to promote the formation of social capital, while vertical teaching practices, such as 
teachers lecturing, seem to discourage it.  Finally, instrumental variable techniques, although not 
perfect  in  our  context,  suggest  that  these  correlations  reflect  causal  effects,  and  not  omitted 
“community social capital” or reverse causality. 
   
Overall, it appears that schools, and not just families, can produce social capital, consistent 
with the case for progressive education as developed by Dewey (1944).  This is a hopeful conclusion 
because  it  suggests  the  possibility  of  altering  social  capital  in  the  community  through  teaching   32 
practices.    In  fact,  the  payoff  to  progressive  education  might  be  higher  than  we  suggest  here.  
Throughout the paper, we have focused only on the social capital payoff.  Yet there is a substantial 
and  growing  body  of  thought  that  non-cognitive  skills,  which  seem  intimately  related  to  social 
capital, have an economic payoff as well (see, for example, Heckman 2008, Brunello and Schlotter 
2010, Lindqvist and Westman 2011, Oreopoulos and Salvanes 2011).   The relationship between 
teaching practices and economic performance of students is one of many open areas that need to be 
explored.    33 
References 
Aghion, Philippe, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc, and Andrei Shleifer (2010). “Regulation and Distrust,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3): 1015-1049. 
 
Algan, Yann, and Pierre Cahuc (2010). “Inherited Trust and Growth,” American Economic Review, 
100(5): 2060-92. 
 
Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba (1989, 1st ed. 1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Banfield, Edward (1958). The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. New York: Free Press. 
 
Barro, Robert, and Jong Wha  Lee (2001). “International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates 
and Implications,” Oxford Economic Papers, 53: 541–563. 
 
Benabou, Roland and  Jean Tirole (2010). “Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, forthcoming.  
 
Bisin Alberto, and Thierry Verdier (2001). “The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics 
of Preferences,” Journal of Economic Theory, 97(2): 298–319. 
 
Bloom, Nicholas, and John Van Reenen (2010). “Why Do Management Practices Differ across Firms 
and Countries?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(1): 203-224. 
 
Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen (2007). “The Organization of Firms Across 
Countries,” Stanford University Mimeo. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean Claude Passeron (1970). La Reproduction. Minuit Edition.  
 
Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis (1976). Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and 
the Contradictions of Capitalist Life. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Brunello, Giorgio, and Martin Schlotter (2010). “The Effect of Non Cognitive Skills and Personality 
Traits on Labour Market Outcomes,” Working paper.  
 
Coleman, James (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Croson, Rachel, and Uri Gneezy (2009). “Gender Differences in Preferences,” Journal of Economic 
Literature, 47(2): 1-27. 
 
Dewey, John (1944).  Democracy and Education, New York, NY: Dover.  
 
Djankov,  Simeon,  Rafael  La  Porta,  Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and  Andrei  Shleifer  (2002).  “The 
Regulation of Entry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1) :1–37. 
 
Djankov, Simeon, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer 
(2003). “The New Comparative Economics,” Journal of Comparative Economics,31: 595-619. 
 
Glaeser,  Edward,  Giacomo  Ponzetto,  and  Andrei  Shleifer  (2007).  “Why  Does  Democracy  Need 
Education?” Journal of Economic Growth, 12:77-99.   34 
 
Guiso,  Luigi,  Paola  Sapienza,  and  Luigi  Zingales  (2004).  “The  Role  of  Social  Capital  in  Financial 
Development,” American Economic Review, 94(3): 526–56. 
 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales (2007). “Long Term Persistence,” Univ. of Chicago, 
Mimeo. 
 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales (2008). “Social Capital as Good Culture,” Journal of the 
European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 6: 295–320. 
 
Guiso,  Luigi,  Paola  Sapienza,  and  Luigi  Zingales  (2009).  “Cultural  Biases  in  Economic  Exchange?” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3): 1095–1131. 
 
Guiso,  Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and  Luigi Zingales (2010). “Civic Capital as the Missing Link,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 15845. 
 
Hanushek,  Eric,  and  Ludger  Woessmann  (2010).  “The  Economics  of  International  Differences  in 
Educational Achievement,” IZA working paper. 
 
Heckman, James (2008). “Schools, Skills and Synapses,” Economic Inquiry, 46(3): 289-324. 
 
Helliwell,  John,  and  Robert  Putnam  (2007).  “Education  and  Social  Capital,”  Eastern  Economics 
Journal, 33(1): 1-19. 
 
Kaufmann, Dani, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2008). “Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and 
Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2007,” World Bank Policy Research WP 4654. 
 
Knack,  Steven,  and  Paul  Keefer  (1997).“Does  Social  Capital  Have  an  Economic  Payoff?  A  Cross-
Country Comparison,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112: 1251–1288. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1997). “Trust in 
Large Organizations,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 87(2): 333-338. 
 
La  Porta,  Rafael,  Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and  Andrei  Shleifer  (2008).  “The  Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins,” Journal of Economic Literature, 46: 285–332. 
 
Lindqvist, Erik, and Roine Westman (2011). “The Labor Market Returns to Cognitive and Noncognitive 
Ability:  Evidence  from  the  Swedish  Experiment,”  American  Economic  Journal:  Applied 
Economics, 3 (1): 101-128. 
 
Lipset, Seymour (1959). “Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, 53: 69–105. 
 
Martin,  M.O  and  Douglas  L.  Kelly  (1997).  “Third  International  Mathematics  and  Science  Study 
Technical Report,” Chesnut Hill, MA: Boston College. 
 
Milligan, Kevin, Enrico Moretti, and Philip Oreopoulos (2004). “Does Education Improve Citizenship? 
Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom,” Journal of Public Economics 88, 
1667-1695.  
 
Oreopoulos, Philip, and Kjell Salvanes (2011). “Priceless: the Nonpecuniary Benefits of Schooling,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, 159-184.   35 
 
Putnam, Robert (1993).  Making Democracy Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Putnam, Robert (2000).  Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: 
Simon & Schuster. 
 
Schuetz,  Gabriela,  Heinrich  Ursprung    and  Ludger  Woessmann  (2008).  “  Education  policy  and 
equality of opportunity,” Kyklos 61: 279-308 
 
Tabellini, Guido, (2008). “The Scope of Cooperation: Norms and Incentives,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 123 (3): 905–950. 
 
Woessmann,  Ludger  (2003).  “Schooling  Resources,  Educational  Institutions,  and  Student 
Performance: The International Evidence,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,65: 117- 
170. 
 
Woessmann, Ludger (2005). “Educational Production in Europe,” Economic Policy, 43: 446-504. 
 
Wooldridge, J. M (1995).  “Score diagnostics for linear models estimated by two stage least squares.”  
In Advances  in Econometrics and Quantitative Economics : Essays in Honor of Professor C. R. Rao, ed. 
G.  S.  Maddala,  P.  C.  B.  Phillips,  and  T.  N.  Srinivasan,  66–87.  Oxford:  Blackwell.  36 
TABLES  
 
Table 1 – “Beliefs in cooperation at schools” – OLS Macro Estimates. Source: PISA, TIMSS  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  «Cooperation among students»  « Cooperation with teachers» 
             
Never work   -.308***      -.163***     
in groups 
 
(.105)      (.049)     
Always take notes     -.255*      -.162**   
from the board 
 
  (.132)      (.059)   
Gap between       -.112***      -.066*** 
Notes – Group  
 
    (.037)      (.019) 
School expenditure  .054  .006  .047  -.003  -.020  -.004 
  (.080)  (.084)  (.079)  (.046)  (.046)  (.040) 
Income per capita  -.026  -.007  -.029  -.004  .000  -.008 
  (.054)  (.058)  (.054)  (.039)  (.030)  (.026) 
Average years of   -.007  -.009  -.014  -.006  -.007  -.010 
education  (.011)  (.012)  (.011)  (.006)  (.008)  (.007) 
             
Observations  30  30  30  30  30  30 
R-squared  0.257  0.132  0.266  0.323  .276  0.382 
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Table 2  – Student feeling of alienation. OLS Macro estimates. Source: PISA, TIMSS, WVS. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  «Respect Parents» - WVS  «Feeling of alienation at school» - PISA 
             
Never work   .088      .010     
in groups 
 
(.120)      (.027)     
Always take notes     .385***      .104***   
from the board 
 
  (.115)      (.017)   
Gap between       .101**      .024** 
Notes – Group  
 
    (.036)      (.009) 
School expenditure  .089  .091  .080  .030*  .024  .021 
  (.062)  (.057)  (.051)  (.017)  (.014)  (.017) 
Income per capita  -.117**  -.112**  -.109***  -.025*  -.019*  -.019 
  (.046)  (.040)  (.035)  (.013)  (.009)  (.012) 
Average years of   -.019  -.011  -.010  .000  .002  .002 
education  (.009)  (.009)  (.010)  (.002)  (.001)  (.002) 
             
Observations  31  31  31  29  29  29 
R-squared  0.471  0.639  0.583  0.426  0.557  0.368 
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Table 3 – Teaching practices, Generalized Trust and Association Membership. OLS Macro estimates. 
Source: TIMSS, WVS.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  «Generalized Trust » - WVS  « Association Membership » - WVS 
             
Never work   -.192*      .001     
in groups 
 
(.107)      (.160)     
Always take notes     -.400***      -.606***   
from the board 
 
  (.133)      (.127)   
Gap between       -.120***      -.128* 
Notes – Group  
 
    (.035)      (.064) 
School expenditure  -.165  -.181*  -.166  -.027  -.086  -.049 
  (.114)  (.104)  (.100)  (.096)  (.072)  (.087) 
Income per capita  .150**  .151**  .146  .098  .116**  .106* 
  (.066)  (.062)  (.058)  (.066)  (.044)  (.056) 
Average years of   .031  .023**  .021**  .068***  .049***  .052*** 
education  (.010)  (.008)  (.009)  (.013)  (.012)  (.016) 
             
Observations  31  31  31  27  27  27 
R-squared  0.47  0.59  0.57  0.59  0.75  0.67 
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Table 4 – Teaching practices and Trust in public officials. OLS Macro estimates. Source: ISSP, TIMSS.   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Trust in Civil Servants – ISSP  Civil Servants treat citizens fairly 
- ISSP 
             
Never work   -.217      -.125     
in groups 
 
(.541)      (.433)     
Always take notes     -1.361**      -1.906***   
from the board 
 
  (.567)      (.420)   
Gap between       -.279      -.392* 
Notes – Group  
 
    (.253)      (.215) 
School expenditure   .071  -.047  -.193  .255  .077  .114 
  (.281)  (.184)  (.196)  (.300)  (.183)  (.223) 
Income per capita  .103  .137  .101  -.025  .013  -.036 
  (.226)  (.142)  (.193)  (.246)  (.147)  (.199) 
Average years of   -.003  -.035  -.030  .011  -.037  -.030 
education  (.024)  (.024)  (.029)  (.044)  (.034)  (.055) 
             
Observations  20  20  20  20  20  20 
R-squared  0.118  0.423  0.229  0.083  0.556  0.266 
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Table 4 (continued) – Teaching practices and Trust in public officials. OLS Macro estimates. Source: 
ISSP, TIMSS.   
  (7)  (8)  (9) 
VARIABLES  Corruption of civil servants –  
ISSP 2006 
       
Never work   .560      
in groups 
 
(.392)     
Always take notes     1.946***   
from the board 
 
  (.470)   
Gap between       .406*** 
Notes – Group  
 
    (.123) 
School expenditure  .241  .505**  .224 
  (.230)  (.235)  (.176) 
Income per capita  -.553**  -.637***  -.535*** 
  (.210)  (.180)  (.161) 
Average years of   -.074  -.033  -.036 
education  (.052)  (.046)  (.056) 
       
Observations  22  22  22 
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Table 5 – Teaching practices and Organization of firms. OLS Macro estimates. Source: ESS, GCR, 
TIMSS  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Delegation of authority – GCR 2009   Freedom in daily work organization – ESS 2008 
             
Never work   -.930       -.881     
in groups 
 
(.693)      (.596)     
Always take notes     -2.247***      -3.101***   
from the board 
 
  (.629)      (.993)   
Gap between       -.633**      -.621** 
Notes – Group  
 
    (.253)      (.273) 
School expenditure  -1.092*  -1.180**  -1.123**  -.097  -.181  -.161 
  (.565)  (.492)  (.478)  (1.155)  (.782)  (.956) 
Income per capita  1.104***  1.114***  1.112***  .999  1.014**  .966* 
  (.334)  (.285)  (.270)  (.656)  (.425)  (.543) 
Average years of   .192**  .152*  .136  .140  .004  .070 
education  (.079)  (.081)  (.091)  (.085  (.066)  (.069) 
             
Observations  28  28  28  18  18  18 
R-squared  0.62  0.71  0.69  0.74  0.84  0.80 
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Table  5  (continued)  –  Teaching  practices  and  Organization  of  firms.  OLS  Macro 
estimates. Source GCR, TIMSS  
  (7)  (8)  (9) 
VARIABLES  Quality of  labor relations  –  
GCR 2009 
       
Never work   -1.394*      
in group 
 
(.812)     
Always take notes     -2.094*   
from the board 
 
  (1.040)   
Gap between       -.665** 
Notes – Group  
 
    (.274) 
School expenditure  -.853*  -.995*  -.908* 
  (.460)  (.496)  (.451) 
Income per capita  .868***  .895**  .869*** 
  (.282)  (.325)  (.284) 
Average years of   .128*  .100  .080 
education  (.074)  (.079)  (.083) 
       
Observations  30  30  30 
R-squared  0.482  0.541  0.582 
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Table 6  – Teaching practices and Institutions. OLS Macro estimates. Source: TIMSS.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Government Effectiveness 
 
 Regulation of entry  
 
             
Never work   -.193       .457     
in groups 
 
(.405)      (.526)     
Always take notes     -1.293***      .843**   
from the board 
 
  (.317)      (.371)   
Gap between       -.303**      .207 
Notes – Group  
 
    (.146)      (.155) 
School expenditure  .023  .026  .045  .010  .065  .040 
  (.314)  (.229)  (.262)  (.237)  (.180)  (.204) 
Income per capita  .666***  .645***  .649***  -.074  -.094  -.086 
  (.191)  (.130)  (.157)  (.189)  (.152)  (.170) 
Average years of   .001  -.029  -.029  -.125***  -.108***  -.109*** 
education  (.039)  (.039)  (.048)  (.028)  (.031)  (.032) 
             
Observations  30  30  30  30  30  30 
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Table 7 – Cooperation among students and with teachers. OLS Macro estimates. Source: PISA, WVS. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Generalized Trust – WVS  Association Memberships – WVS 
             
Cooperation with teachers     0.601**  .595**    .176   
    (0.219)  (.221)    (.407)   
Cooperation among students  .197*      .437*    .628** 
  (.112)      (.216)    (.287) 
School expenditure  -.277**  -.239***  -.179**  -.092  -.027  -.219 
  (.107)  (.071)  (.077)  (.121)  (.142)  (.153) 
Income per capita   .222***  .197***  .145**  .128  .091  .213* 
  (.062)  (.047)  (.052)  (.081)  (.095)  (.106) 
Average years of education  .032***  .030  .010  .066***      .067***  .044** 
  (.010)  (.011)  (.017)  (.012)  (.013)  (.020) 
Hierarchical religion       -.062      .026 
      (.065)      (.116) 
Common Law      .017      -.068 
      (.059)      (.102) 
German Law      .027      .137* 
      (.057)      (.068) 
Scandinavian Law      .153*      .201 
      (.076      (.139) 
             
Observations  30  30  30  26  26  26 
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Table  8  –  Sources  of  variations  in  teaching  practices  across  schools  and  within  schools:                      
OLS Micro estimates. Source: CES. 
  Variation between schools  Variation within schools  
    VARIABLES  Students work in 
group 
Teacher lectures  Students work in 
groups 
Teacher lectures 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
   Student Gender (female)  0.005  0.011*  0.000  0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
   Father’s education  0.004**  0.012***  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
   Mother’s education  0.005***  0.007***  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.0019) 
   Number of books at home  0.004**  -0.001  0.000  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
   Immigrant   -0.024**  -0.073***  -0.003  0.001 
  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
   Student Age   -0.006*  -3.40e-05  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
   Teacher age  -0.049***  -0.026***  -0.042***  -0.032*** 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
  Teacher education  0.005  0.001  0.023***  0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
  Teacher experience  0.004***  -0.000  0.004***  -0.001* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  Teacher social capital  0.147***  0.076***  0.162***  0.122*** 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
  Teacher goal: promote cooperation  0.304***  -0.103***  0.291***  -0.080*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
  Teacher : instructional time constraints  -0.031***  0.031***  -0.015**  0.0381*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
  Teacher gender  0.227***  -0.119***  0.169***  -0.053*** 
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
  Class size (ln)  0.043***  0.141***     
  (0.016)  (0.017)     
  Public school  -0.049***  -0.131***     
  (0.011)  (0.013)     
  School social capital  0.061***  -0.013     
  (0.0133)  (0.016)     
  School goal: promote cooperation  -0.005  -0.047**     
  (0.005)  (0.006)     
  Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes     
  School fixed effects      Yes  Yes 
  Observations  75038  74872  62838  62660 
  R-squared  0.305  0.158  0.070  0.013 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 9 – Student belief in cooperation among students and between students and teachers: OLS 
Micro estimates. Source: CES  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Beliefs in cooperation among children  Beliefs in cooperation between children 
and teachers 
Teaching practices         
Students work in groups  0.0117***    0.0212***   
  (0.00331)    (0.00390)   
Teacher lectures    -0.00817***    -0.00646* 
    (0.00279)    (0.00332) 
         
Controls         
Student Gender (female)  0.125***  0.124***  0.189***  0.189*** 
  (0.00628)  (0.00629)  (0.00742)  (0.00742) 
Father’s education  -0.00289  -0.00266  0.0103***  0.0107*** 
  (0.00251)  (0.00251)  (0.00299)  (0.00299) 
Mother’s education  -0.00373  -0.00365  0.00149  0.00146 
  (0.00261)  (0.00261)  (0.00309)  (0.00309) 
Number of books at home  0.00779***  0.00772***  0.0247***  0.0246*** 
  (0.00297)  (0.00297)  (0.00345)  (0.00345) 
Grade  0.651***  0.657***  -0.441***  -0.432*** 
  (0.0169)  (0.0169)  (0.0197)  (0.0196) 
Immigrant   -0.00178  -0.00297  0.0239  0.0231 
  (0.0133)  (0.0133)  (0.0155)  (0.0155) 
Student Age   -0.00376  -0.00383  -0.00449  -0.00496 
  (0.00466)  (0.00466)  (0.00552)  (0.00552) 
Teacher age  -0.00173  -0.00265  0.0104**  0.00868* 
  (0.00400)  (0.00398)  (0.00481)  (0.00480) 
Teacher education  -0.00421  -0.00401  -0.00769**  -0.00792** 
  (0.00277)  (0.00277)  (0.00325)  (0.00326) 
Teacher experience  0.000609  0.000640  -0.00103**  -0.000868* 
  (0.000430)  (0.000430)  (0.000521)  (0.000521) 
Teacher social capital  -0.00489  -0.00317  0.00297  0.00609 
  (0.00406)  (0.00406)  (0.00482)  (0.00483) 
Teacher goal: promote cooperation  0.0146***  0.0184***  0.0166***  0.0243*** 
  (0.00519)  (0.00513)  (0.00610)  (0.00604) 
Class size (ln)  -0.0237  -0.0261  -0.0578***  -0.0594*** 
  (0.0171)  (0.0171)  (0.0194)  (0.0195) 
Public school  0.0318**  0.0301**  -0.0186  -0.0207 
  (0.0129)  (0.0129)  (0.0152)  (0.0152) 
School social capital  0.0328**  0.0318**  0.0808***  0.0790*** 
  (0.0140)  (0.0141)  (0.0166)  (0.0166) 
School goal: promote cooperation  0.00515  0.00538  -0.0109  -0.0104 
  (0.00642)  (0.00641)  (0.00743)  (0.00743) 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  73216  73053  72963  72798 
R-squared  0.089  0.089  0.085  0.084 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 10 – Association membership and trust in institutions. OLS Micro estimates. Source: CES  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Association Membership  Trust in Institutions 
Teaching practices         
Students work in groups  0.0739***    0.00784**   
  (0.0134)    (0.00319)   
Teacher lectures    -0.0185    0.00111 
    (0.0118)    (0.00279) 
         
Controls         
Student Gender (female)  0.201***  0.203***  -0.0149**  -0.0142** 
  (0.0256)  (0.0256)  (0.00609)  (0.00609) 
Father’s education  0.0581***  0.0586***  0.00546**  0.00555** 
  (0.0103)  (0.0103)  (0.00238)  (0.00238) 
Mother’s education  0.0768***  0.0773***  0.000399  0.000421 
  (0.0107)  (0.0107)  (0.00250)  (0.00250) 
Number of books at home  0.217***  0.217***  -0.00162  -0.00189 
  (0.0120)  (0.0120)  (0.00285)  (0.00285) 
Grade  -1.549***  -1.511***  -0.534***  -0.527*** 
  (0.0618)  (0.0612)  (0.0172)  (0.0171) 
Immigrant   -0.0732  -0.0762  0.0122  0.0122 
  (0.0576)  (0.0577)  (0.0130)  (0.0130) 
Student Age   0.0116  0.0104  -0.00476  -0.00465 
  (0.0205)  (0.0205)  (0.00479)  (0.00479) 
Teacher age  0.0117  0.00569  0.00226  0.00189 
  (0.0160)  (0.0161)  (0.00389)  (0.00389) 
Teacher education  -0.0206*  -0.0199*  -0.00588**  -0.00606** 
  (0.0115)  (0.0116)  (0.00270)  (0.00271) 
Teacher experience  -0.000297  8.81e-05  -1.65e-05  2.86e-06 
  (0.00171)  (0.00171)  (0.000422)  (0.000423) 
Teacher social capital  0.000252  0.00924  0.00485  0.00504 
  (0.0174)  (0.0174)  (0.00407)  (0.00407) 
Teacher goal: promote cooperation  -0.0382*  -0.0121  0.00816  0.0113** 
  (0.0212)  (0.0210)  (0.00504)  (0.00497) 
Class size (ln)  -0.355***  -0.357***  -0.0315*  -0.0314* 
  (0.0666)  (0.0671)  (0.0169)  (0.0170) 
Public school  -0.131**  -0.138**  0.0136  0.0132 
  (0.0563)  (0.0564)  (0.0125)  (0.0125) 
School social capital  0.0659  0.0666  0.0515***  0.0507*** 
  (0.0581)  (0.0582)  (0.0138)  (0.0138) 
School goal: promote cooperation  0.00615  0.00388  0.000298  0.000454 
  (0.0257)  (0.0257)  (0.00616)  (0.00616) 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  75038  74872  73958  73793 
R-squared  0.133  0.132  0.090  0.090 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 11 – Student attitudes towards Political and Social Life. OLS Micro estimates. Source: CES. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Index Participation Political Life  Index Participation Social life 
Teaching practices         
Students work in groups  0.0113***    0.0101***   
  (0.00277)    (0.00354)   
Teacher lectures    -0.00521**    -0.00779** 
    (0.00238)    (0.00305) 
         
Controls         
Student Gender (female)  0.0127**  0.0128**  0.0449***  0.0453*** 
  (0.00531)  (0.00531)  (0.00679)  (0.00679) 
Father’s education  0.0132***  0.0137***  -0.000819  -0.000353 
  (0.00212)  (0.00212)  (0.00273)  (0.00272) 
Mother’s education  0.0131***  0.0131***  0.00301  0.00294 
  (0.00219)  (0.00219)  (0.00280)  (0.00280) 
Number of books at home  0.0244***  0.0241***  0.00828***  0.00815*** 
  (0.00249)  (0.00249)  (0.00314)  (0.00315) 
Grade  -0.237***  -0.231***  -0.585***  -0.581*** 
  (0.0143)  (0.0142)  (0.0180)  (0.0179) 
Immigrant   0.0363***  0.0365***  0.0422***  0.0413*** 
  (0.0111)  (0.0111)  (0.0142)  (0.0142) 
Student Age   -0.00795*  -0.00817**  -0.0150***  -0.0148*** 
  (0.00407)  (0.00407)  (0.00527)  (0.00526) 
Teacher age  -1.89e-05  -0.00100  -0.00226  -0.00264 
  (0.00343)  (0.00342)  (0.00442)  (0.00442) 
Teacher education  -0.000966  -0.00138  0.00124  0.000917 
  (0.00236)  (0.00236)  (0.00306)  (0.00306) 
Teacher experience  0.000291  0.000375  0.000873*  0.000923** 
  (0.000368)  (0.000369)  (0.000467)  (0.000468) 
Teacher social capital  0.00555  0.00642*  -0.00436  -0.00281 
  (0.00349)  (0.00350)  (0.00446)  (0.00448) 
Teacher goal: promote cooperation  -0.00465  -0.00112  0.00844  0.0107* 
  (0.00435)  (0.00429)  (0.00561)  (0.00553) 
Class size (ln)  -0.00408  -0.00365  -0.0139  -0.0118 
  (0.0139)  (0.0140)  (0.0186)  (0.0187) 
Public school  0.00134  0.000312  0.0502***  0.0489*** 
  (0.0108)  (0.0108)  (0.0144)  (0.0144) 
School social capital  0.0365***  0.0355***  0.0193  0.0210 
  (0.0121)  (0.0121)  (0.0154)  (0.0154) 
School goal: promote cooperation  0.00984*  0.00957*  0.00946  0.00804 
  (0.00531)  (0.00531)  (0.00690)  (0.00689) 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  74474  74308  74131  73965 
R-squared  0.110  0.109  0.083  0.083 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 12 –Socio Economic Family Backgrounds and the relation between Teaching practices and 
Students Beliefs. OLS Micro Estimates. Source: CES.  
 
  Beliefs in cooperation among students  Beliefs in cooperation with teachers 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES  Share of low 
socioeconomic 
backgrounds 
< National average 
Share of low 
socioeconomic 
backgrounds 
> National average 
Share of low 
socioeconomic 
backgrounds 
< National average 
Share of low 
socioeconomic 
backgrounds 
> National average 
Students work   0.008    0.012**    0.014    0.028***   
in groups  (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.009)    (0.009)   
                 
Teacher 
Lectures 
  -0.009*    -0.013***    -0.004    -0.019*** 
    (0.005)    (0.004)    (0.005)    0.005) 
                 
                 
Observations  36142  35979  29485  29489  36035  35872  29401  29404 
R-squared  0.094  0.094  0.096  0.096  0.071  0.071  0.093  0.093 
Additional controls. Student level: age, gender, immigrant, number of books at home, education of the parents. 
Teacher level: age, gender, education, years of experience, trust, attitudes towards cooperation. School level: 
(ln)-size of the class, public institution, social capital. Country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at 
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Table 13: Second Stage Estimates for the teaching practice “Students work in groups” – 2SLS Micro 
estimates. Source: CES.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Cooperation with teachers  Cooperation among students  Association membership 
Teaching practices             
Students work in group  0.0374    0.0567***    0.0359   
  (0.0256)    (0.0217)    (0.0902)   
Teacher lectures    -0.0726*    -0.106***    -0.114 
    (0.0460)    (0.0408)    (0.167) 
Controls             
Student Gender (female)  0.190***  0.189***  0.124***  0.125***  0.201***  0.204*** 
  (0.00744)  (0.00745)  (0.00628)  (0.00633)  (0.0256)  (0.0256) 
Father’s education  0.0106***  0.00978***  -0.00312  -0.00150  0.0583***  0.0598*** 
  (0.00300)  (0.00304)  (0.00251)  (0.00257)  (0.0103)  (0.0105) 
Mother’s education  0.00176  0.000828  -0.00397  -0.00291  0.0770***  0.0780*** 
  (0.00310)  (0.00312)  (0.00262)  (0.00264)  (0.0107)  (0.0108) 
Number of books at home  0.0250***  0.0247***  0.00755**  0.00771***  0.217***  0.217*** 
  (0.00345)  (0.00346)  (0.00297)  (0.00298)  (0.0120)  (0.0120) 
Grade  -0.406***  -0.403***  0.624***  0.622***  -1.525***  -1.545*** 
  (0.0251)  (0.0263)  (0.0213)  (0.0221)  (0.0823)  (0.0857) 
Immigrant   0.0227  0.0293*  -0.00100  -0.0103  -0.0740  -0.0833 
  (0.0156)  (0.0161)  (0.0133)  (0.0139)  (0.0576)  (0.0593) 
Student Age   -0.00499  -0.00491  -0.00337  -0.00384  0.0113  0.0104 
  (0.00553)  (0.00553)  (0.00467)  (0.00468)  (0.0205)  (0.0205) 
Teacher age  0.00666  0.0103**  0.00118  -0.00441  0.00924  0.00390 
  (0.00512)  (0.00490)  (0.00428)  (0.00406)  (0.0171)  (0.0163) 
Teacher education  -0.00759**  -0.00820**  -0.00435  -0.00369  -0.0206*  -0.0195* 
  (0.00326)  (0.00328)  (0.00278)  (0.00280)  (0.0115)  (0.0116) 
Teacher experience  -0.000737  -0.000812  0.000381  0.000557  -0.000108  1.10e-05 
  (0.000541)  (0.000527)  (0.000449)  (0.000437)  (0.00178)  (0.00172) 
Teacher social capital  0.00925*  -0.00183  -0.00969**  0.00659  0.00427  0.0187 
  (0.00551)  (0.00686)  (0.00463)  (0.00583)  (0.0195)  (0.0245) 
Teacher goal: cooperation  0.0356***  0.0336***  -4.06e-06  0.00688  -0.0259  -0.0230 
  (0.0102)  (0.00825)  (0.00859)  (0.00702)  (0.0357)  (0.0281) 
Class size (ln)  -0.0557***  -0.0706***  -0.0253  -0.0124  -0.353***  -0.344*** 
  (0.0194)  (0.0207)  (0.0171)  (0.0181)  (0.0667)  (0.0710) 
Public school  -0.0210  -0.0104  0.0339***  0.0173  -0.133**  -0.151** 
  (0.0153)  (0.0164)  (0.0129)  (0.0142)  (0.0563)  (0.0618) 
School social capital  0.0841***  0.0795***  0.0301**  0.0310**  0.0680  0.0655 
  (0.0167)  (0.0167)  (0.0141)  (0.0141)  (0.0585)  (0.0583) 
School goal: Cooperation   -0.0106  -0.00630  0.00494  0.000388  0.00632  -0.00113 
  (0.00744)  (0.00784)  (0.00642)  (0.00680)  (0.0257)  (0.0273) 
Country fixed effects 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P-value overid test  0.378  0.583  0.580  0.389  0.237  0.229 




266.6  159.06  263.13  158.21  276.96  162.6 
Observations  72963  72798  73216  73053  75038  74872 
R-squared  0.081  0.075  0.086  0.070  0.133  0.131 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13 (Continued): Second Stage Estimates for the teaching practice “Students work in groups” – 
2SLS Micro estimates. Source: CES.  
 
  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 




Trust in institutions 
Teaching practices             
Students work in group  0.0285*    0.0873***    0.0154   
  (0.0102)    (0.0236)    (0.0212)   
Teacher lectures    -0.0538**    -0.164***    -0.0339 
    (0.0240)    (0.0445)    (0.0396) 
Controls             
Student Gender (female)  0.0126**  0.0133**  0.0443***  0.0470***  -0.0150**  -0.0139** 
  (0.00531)  (0.00533)  (0.00680)  (0.00687)  (0.00609)  (0.00611) 
Father’s education  0.0131***  0.0142***  -0.00122  0.00154  0.00542**  0.00597** 
  (0.00212)  (0.00216)  (0.00274)  (0.00280)  (0.00238)  (0.00243) 
Mother’s education  0.0130***  0.0135***  0.00257  0.00420  0.000355  0.000709 
  (0.00219)  (0.00221)  (0.00281)  (0.00283)  (0.00250)  (0.00252) 
Number of books at home  0.0243***  0.0241***  0.00795**  0.00799**  -0.00166  -0.00194 
  (0.00249)  (0.00250)  (0.00315)  (0.00317)  (0.00285)  (0.00285) 
Grade  -0.248***  -0.248***  -0.633***  -0.637***  -0.538***  -0.539*** 
  (0.0182)  (0.0189)  (0.0230)  (0.0242)  (0.0215)  (0.0223) 
Immigrant   0.0366***  0.0327***  0.0438***  0.0294**  0.0124  0.00947 
  (0.0111)  (0.0115)  (0.0143)  (0.0148)  (0.0130)  (0.0133) 
Student Age   -0.00782*  -0.00814**  -0.0144***  -0.0148***  -0.00470  -0.00462 
  (0.00408)  (0.00407)  (0.00528)  (0.00529)  (0.00479)  (0.00479) 
Teacher age  0.00108  -0.00192  0.00271  -0.00551  0.00274  0.00125 
  (0.00364)  (0.00348)  (0.00470)  (0.00456)  (0.00414)  (0.00395) 
Teacher education  -0.000998  -0.00115  0.00103  0.00156  -0.00590**  -0.00592** 
  (0.00236)  (0.00237)  (0.00307)  (0.00312)  (0.00270)  (0.00271) 
Teacher experience  0.000205  0.000337  0.000484  0.000794*  -5.45e-05  -2.56e-05 
  (0.000382)  (0.000372)  (0.000486)  (0.000480)  (0.000438)  (0.000425) 
Teacher social capital  0.00373  0.0113**  -0.0125**  0.0130**  0.00405  0.00856 
  (0.00393)  (0.00496)  (0.00506)  (0.00649)  (0.00464)  (0.00568) 
Teacher goal: cooperation  -0.0102  -0.00680  -0.0166*  -0.00764  0.00573  0.00718 
  (0.00725)  (0.00582)  (0.00935)  (0.00761)  (0.00830)  (0.00667) 
Class size (ln)  -0.00471  0.00333  -0.0167  0.0107  -0.0318*  -0.0264 
  (0.0140)  (0.0148)  (0.0187)  (0.0200)  (0.0169)  (0.0180) 
Public school  0.00210  -0.00621  0.0536***  0.0281*  0.0139  0.00857 
  (0.0108)  (0.0119)  (0.0144)  (0.0157)  (0.0125)  (0.0136) 
School social capital  0.0355***  0.0351***  0.0148  0.0198  0.0510***  0.0505*** 
  (0.0121)  (0.0121)  (0.0155)  (0.0155)  (0.0139)  (0.0138) 
School goal: cooperation  0.00978*  0.00698  0.00918  -0.000247  0.000268  -0.00141 
  (0.00531)  (0.00560)  (0.00690)  (0.00734)  (0.00616)  (0.00654) 
Country fixed effects 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P-value overid test  0.223  0.159  0.798  0.480  0.894  0.742 




278.64  162.79  276.69  162.228  271.24  159.14 
Observations  74474  74308  74131  73965  73958  73793 
R-squared  0.109  0.103  0.076  0.042  0.090  0.087 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14 – Cognitive Skills and Teaching practices. OLS Micro estimates. Source TIMSS.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Cognitive Test Scores 
Teaching practices         
Students take note from the board  -7.140***       
  (1.034)       
Students work in groups    -5.774***     
    (1.076)     
Take notes – Never 
 
    Reference   
Take notes – Sometime      1.344   
      (3.717)   
Take notes – Often      -10.98***   
      (4.006)   
Take notes – Always      -15.84***   
      (4.332)   
Work in groups – Never        Reference 
         
Work in groups – Sometime        7.883*** 
        (1.888) 
Work in groups – Often        -1.313 
        (3.073) 
Work in groups – Always        -23.82*** 
        (3.066) 
Student controls         
Girl  -5.064***  -4.879***  -5.160***  -5.359*** 
  (1.423)  (1.421)  (1.417)  (1.394) 
Age  3.415***  3.544***  3.493***  3.421*** 
  (0.978)  (0.966)  (0.978)  (0.950) 
Born abroad  -11.97***  -11.69***  -11.86***  -11.20*** 
  (3.156)  (3.095)  (3.149)  (3.006) 
Number of books at home  14.71***  14.66***  14.68***  14.61*** 
  (0.636)  (0.632)  (0.637)  (0.626) 
Mother’s education  4.680***  4.863***  4.667***  4.829*** 
  (0.510)  (0.520)  (0.509)  (0.504) 
Father’s education  5.656***  5.447***  5.638***  5.493*** 
  (0.570)  (0.566)  (0.570)  (0.568) 
Teacher and School controls         
Teacher’s age  2.658  2.894  2.640  3.005 
  (3.143)  (3.183)  (3.135)  (3.167) 
Teacher’s gender (female)  8.814**  8.975**  8.858**  8.624** 
  (4.129)  (4.019)  (4.128)  (3.874) 
Teacher’s education  6.160***  6.542***  6.129***  6.898*** 
  (2.026)  (1.900)  (2.024)  (1.819) 
Teacher’s experience  0.222  0.228  0.229  0.241 
  (0.309)  (0.308)  (0.311)  (0.306) 
Class size (ln)  3.958  5.191  4.090  5.580 
  (6.725)  (6.198)  (6.800)  (6.067) 
Shortage of instruction materials  -3.418*  -3.488**  -3.438*  -3.399** 
  (1.777)  (1.690)  (1.780)  (1.623) 
Urban area  5.376***  4.582***  5.380***  4.959*** 
  (1.724)  (1.716)  (1.731)  (1.671) 
Observations  108506  108506  108506  108506 
R-squared  0.274  0.271  0.275  0.278 
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Table 15 – Cognitive skills and Average years of education. OLS Macro estimates. Source: TIMSS. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Cognitive skills in grade 8th –  
TIMSS 1995 
Average years of education 
             
Never work   .741      -1.253     
in groups 
 
(.120)      (1.756)     
Always take notes     1.387      -4.133**   
from the board 
 
  (1.187)      (1.760)   
Gap between       .326      -1.271*** 
Notes and Group  
 
    (.224)      (.406) 
School expenditure  .533  .510  .534  1.907  .889  1.963 
  (.376)  (.302)  (.328)  (1.400)  (.544)  (1.262) 
Income per capita  -.311  -.278  -.109  -.523  -.748  -.706  
  (.254)  (.220)  (.035)  (.930)  (.797)  (.828) 
             
Observations  28  28  28  30  30  30 
R-squared  0.068  0.102  0.088  0.281  0.557  0.372 
 
 
Table 16 – Share of repeaters and Socioeconomic inequality. OLS Macro estimates. Source: PISA, 
TIMSS. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Share of repeaters   Index  of  socio-economic  inequality  in 
cognitive scores 
             
Never work   .177      .254     
in groups 
 
(.142)      (.200)     
Always take notes     .324**      .573***   
from the board 
 
  (.148)      (.200)   
Gap between       .084*      .128** 
Notes and Group  
 
    (.044)      (.058) 
School expenditure   .099  .096  .102  -.115  .183  .196 
  (.072)  (.065)  (.065)  (.125)  (.140)  (.147) 
Income per capita  -.051  -.032  -.042  -.115  -.079  -.100  
  (.047)  (.037)  (.040)  (.125)  (.115)  (.122) 
Observations  28  28  28  28  28  28 
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Appendix   
Appendix A – Descriptive statistics 
Table A1- Definition and descriptive statistics for the database “Civic Education Study”. 
Variable definitions  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
“Teacher lectures”: This variable derives from the question: “In your class, how often 
does the teacher lecture?” The answer equals 1 for “Never”, 2 for “Sometimes”, 3 for 
“Often” and 4 for “Very often”. Source: Teacher survey 
2.338  .868 
“Students work in groups”: This variable derives from the question: “In your class, how 
often  do  the  students  work  in  groups?”  The  answer  equals  1  for  “Never”,  2  for 
“Sometimes”, 3 for “Often” and 4 for “Very often”. Source: Teacher survey 
2.557  .787 
Teacher’s age. Variable with six categories: 1=under 25 years old, 2= 25-29 years old, 
3= 30-39 years old, 4=40-49 years old, 5=50-59 years old, 6=60 years old or more. 
Source: Teacher survey 
3.667  1.109 
Teacher’s education. This variable measures the highest level of former education, in 5 
categories. Source: Teacher survey 
3.076  1.235 
Teacher’s experience: number of years of teaching altogether. Source: Teacher survey  16.712  10.599 
Teacher’s gender: dummy variable equal 1 if female, and 0 for male. Source Teacher 
survey 
.668  .470 
Teacher’s trust: This variable is the average of questions1)“How much confidence do 
you  have  in      the  political  system?”,2)  “How  much  confidence  do  you  have  in 
elections?”, 3) “How much confidence do you have in the judicial system?”, 4) “How 
much confidence do you have  in immigration?”, 5) “How much confidence do you 
have in social welfare?”, 6) “How much confidence do you have in labor unions?”. The 
answers equal 1 for “Not at all”, 2 for “Little confidence”, 3 for “Confident” and 4 for 
“Very confident”. Source: Teacher survey 
2.615  .574 
Teacher’s  beliefs  in  cooperation:  This  variable  is  the  average  of  the  questions 
1)“Students learn at school to understand people” and 2) “Students learn at school is 
to cooperate in groups”. The answers range from 1 for “Strongly disagree” to 4 for 
“Strongly agree”. Source: Teacher survey.  
3.074  .484 
Size of the class: number of students per classroom. Source: School Survey   25.66  6.48 
School social capital: “How frequently each of the following occurs at your school? a) 
Vandalism,  b)  Drugs,  c)  Truancy,  d)  Racism,  e)  Religious  intolerance,  f)  Alcohol,  g) 
Bullying,  h)  Violence”.  1=Often,  2=Sometimes,  3=Never.  Average  answers.    Source: 
School Survey 
1.47  0.26 
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Table A1 (continued) 
Variables – Student characteristics  Means  Standard 
deviation 
Student age: number of years. Source: Student survey  14.166  .704 
Student gender: dummy equal 1 if female, and 0 otherwise. Source: Student survey     
Immigrant: dummy variable  equal 1 if the  student is born abroad, 0 otherwise. Source: 
Student survey 
.066  .247 
Grade: variable equal 8 for the 8
th grade, and 9 for the 9
th grade. Only one grade per country. 
Source: student survey 
8.337  .473 
Mother’s education: This variable derives from the question “How far in school did your 
mother go?” The answer equals 1=No elementary education, 2=Finish elementary school, 3= 
high school, 4=Completed high school, 5= Some higher technical education, 6=Some college, 
university, 7=Graduate education. Source: Student survey 
4.156  1.578 
Father’s  education:  This variable derives  from the question “How far in school did your 
father go?” The answer equals =No elementary education, 2=Finish elementary school, 3= 
high school, 4=Completed high school, 5= Some higher technical education, 6=Some college, 
university, 7=Graduate education. Source: Student survey 
4.183  1.563 
Number of books at home: measured by the question “How many books are there in your 
home?”.  The answer has  7 categories: 1=None, 2=1-10  books, 3=11-50 books, 4=51-100 
books, 5=101-200 books, 6=more than 200 books. Source: Student survey 
4.287  1.350 
“Student’s  belief  in  cooperation  among  students“.  This  variable  is  the  average  of  the 
questions: 1) “The goal of education is to understand people with different ideas” and 2) 
“The goal of education is to learn how to cooperate in groups with other students”. The 
answers ranges from 1 for Strongly Disagree, 2 for Disagree, 3 for Agree and 4 for Strongly 
Agree. Source: student survey 
3.136  .556 
“Student’s belief in cooperation between students and teacher“. This variable is the average 
of  the  questions:  1)  “Are  students  encouraged  to  make  up  their  own  opinion?”,  2)“Do 
teacher respect your opinion?”,  3)“ Do you feel free to express opinions in class?”,  4)“Do 
you feel free to openly disagree with the teacher?”. The answers range from 1 for strongly 
disagree to 4 for strongly agree. Source: student survey.  
3.040  .660 
“Student association membership”. This variable is the sum of the 15 items related to an 
association  membership:  “Have  you  ever  participated  to:  A  student  council?  A  youth 
organization? A school newspaper? An environmental organization? A U.N or UNESCO Club? 
A  Student  exchange  program?  A  Human  Rights  Organization?  A  Group  Conducting  
Activities?  A  Charity  Collecting  ?  A  boy  or  girl  scout  group?  A  cultural  association?  A 
computer club? An art, drama or music association? A Sport Organization? An association 
supported  by  a  religious  group?“..  For  each  association,  the  answer  equal  1  if  the 
respondent participates to it and 0 otherwise. Source: student survey. 
2.955  2.331 
“Student’s  level  of  trust”.  This  variable  is  the  average  of  the  questions  “How  much 
confidence do you have in: 1) Justice? 2) The Police?,3) Education institutions/Schools?”. 
The answers equal 1 for “Not at all”, 2 for “Little confidence”, 3 for “Confident” and 4 for 
“Very confident”. Source: Student survey 
2.824  .537 
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Table A2 – Samples of schools and teaching practices. Source: CES.  
Country  Number  of 
schools 
Number  of 
students 
    Country level         
      Lecture 
Mean           Std  
    Country level 
         Group 
Mean             Std 
Within  school 
variation (std) 
Lecture     Group 
AUS  142  3330  2.199  .677  2.745  .725  .098  .091 
BGR  139  2674  2.687  .823  2.273  .751  .295  .346 
CHE  155  3065  1.564  .680  2.510  .760  .214  .139 
CHL  180  5688  2.601  .727  3.248  .687  .210  .186 
CYP  61  3106  2.688  .768  2.256  .698  .392  .478 
CZE  148  3607  2.400  .843  2.196  .685  .247  .352 
DEU  169  3700  1.591  .675  2.260  .660     
DNK  173  3124  2.073  .626  2.961  .677  .126  .086 
EST  122  2927  2.365  .793  2.343  .737  .215  .239 
FIN  146  2780  2.375  .801  2.445  .621  .065  .052 
GRC  139  3391  2.656  .901  2.043  .712  .266  .306 
HUN  146  3167  2.338  .872  2.239  .680     
ITA  172  3808  2.942  .726  2.382  .754  .028  .019 
LTU  169  3494  2.127  .830  2.519  .701     
LVA  130  2572  2.359  .784  2.395  .683  .336  .446 
NOR  150  3258  2.478  .628  2.665  .690  .175  .195 
POL  178  3347  2.798  .811  3.071  .788  .140  .157 
PRT  148  3228  2.450  .731  2.270  .528  .215  .391 
ROM  146  2985  3.185  .832  2.231  .795  .202  .291 
RUS  184  2120  2.968  .700  2.120  .653  .055  .026 
SVK  145  3456  1.977  .884  2.364  .651  .198  .324 
SVN  149  3068  1.941  .845  2.701  .754  .202  .250 
SWE  138  3071  2.276  .574  2.663  .747  .201  .101 
UK  128  3039  1.864  .762  2.475  .751  .344  .366 
USA  124  2811  2.428  .817  2.720  .788     
 
 
 